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STEELE, CAROLYN MARIE, Ed.D. Theory and Experience of 
Relationships from a Phenomenological Perspective. (1989) 
Directed by Dr. David E. Purpel., 158 pp. 
This dissertation focuses on selected educational 
theories of relationships and personal experiences from a 
phenomenological research methodology. It assumes that we 
undergo a dialectic between theory and practice of 
relationships where we modify or reconstruct one on the 
basis of the other. Acting as a structuring device for 
interpreting our experiences, theory gives us explanations 
for why we engage in encounters with others, nature, and 
possibly a spiritual Being. 
Chapter one critically examines pertinent educational 
theories, particulary Martin Buber, Paulo Freire, and Sharon 
Welch. Each theorists gives a somewhat different dimension 
for interpreting our relationships. Buber adds basic ground 
work for comparing some types of relationships—I-It, I-
Thou, and I-Eternal Thou—while Freire contributes a 
political perspective of oppressed and oppressor 
individuals. Welch, additionally, supplies a female 
perspective on the praxis of relationships, the union of 
theory and practice supplemented by critical reflection. 
Perceptions of relationships depend in part upon 
factors that can function to impede or promote our ties with 
other people. Chapter two explores four of these aspects. 
Self-knowledge relates to how we see ourselves as well as 
others, for we cannot define ourselves as human without some 
knowledge of what is entailed in being human (Heschel, 
1965). An autobiographical section narrates personal 
experiences that illustrate the on-going quest for a clearer 
perception of the self with which to meet others. 
Similarly, we are thrown into existence (Heidegger, 1962) 
with traits over which we have little control. I look at 
gender, socio-economic class, and sub-culture, all of which 
interact to fashion one into the person he or she is. I am 
especially concerned with the relational barriers of coming 
from a working-class background, being female, and growing 
up in a Southern rural region. 
Chapter three presents a different type of 
relationship, alienation and marginality, which offers us 
the chance to distance ourselves from others for a re-
evaluation of the people we are and the relationships we 
have formed. We can even reach the depths of our being to 
gain new knowledge and perspectives, but a major question 
for our relationships becomes whether or not we remain 
estranged from others or go forth again into new and 
continuing relationships. 
Finally, because this dissertation employs personal 
knowledge as support for its position, it includes an 
afterword on the dissertation process, particularly in 
reference to its research methodology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation deals with an examination of the 
concept of relationships with particular reference to its 
significance to educational theory. Methodologically, the 
dissertation focuses on the practice of relationships as 
shown by personal experiences and critical reflection. 
Serving as an explanation for our experiences, theory 
provides us with a conceptual basis for the comprehension 
and interpretation of them. When we learn about a theory, 
we can internalize the information in its entirety or in 
bits and pieces, just as we can reinterpret our experiences 
on the basis of theory. A tension exists between the two, 
where we use theory in terms of our experiences and connect 
our experiences to theory. From this metaphorical back-and-
forth process, we can begin to understand who we are and the 
nature of our relationships. 
My mode of inquiry involves an investigation of 
personal experiences and knowledge, including my own, in an 
attempt to learn about how the self permeates our activities 
and the research we conduct. We can deliberately be present 
in our work when we use the voice of I, or we can 
purposefully conceal ourselves with techniques like third 
person singular pronouns and a more objective, empirical 
approach. No matter which type of research we choose, I hold 
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that we will be present in it. We are the ones who analyze 
the data and highlight certain factors for prominence over 
others. Our past experiences and knowledge determine how we 
will interpret information and which theorists we use to 
support our conclusions, just as our thoughts are never 
neutral or indifferent when we think about someone or 
something (Heschel, 1965, p. 7). Due to the nature of these 
beliefs, I will be very present in my research. 
In my research I also rely upon a phenomenological 
methodology, with its practice of a suspension of prejudices 
and biases. It will serve as a structure for me to delve 
into theory and experience in an effort to place some order 
upon them. I can, furthermore, apply it as a procedure for 
emphasizing the processes of reflection and description 
within a theoretical backdrop (Suransky, 1980, pp. 170-171). 
With a stress upon the researcher being in a state of 
epoche, it demands that we be open to others as well as to 
ourselves and allows for critical reflection about our 
experiences. We work to accept each aspect of our inquiry 
as separate "phenomena," Husserl's designation of the 
contents of our minds of which we are conscious (Kneller, 
1984, p. 27). We enter into the stream of individual 
consciousness and examine our thoughts, perceptions, 
feelings, and other mental states, for we must look openly 
and directly at our minds to investigate the data gained 
from our experiences. 
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Another central concept involved in my research will be 
that of hegemony, the system of beliefs, morals, and values 
of the State and dominant class which have infiltrated all 
other subcultures of a society. Implicit in its definition 
are certain criteria which a series of ideas must meet 
before they become part of the hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). 
They must, first, constitute a way of seeing the world in a 
manner that is neither conscious nor intended. No evil 
genius is sitting in an office deciding which value system 
to introduce into a society and which to delete. Instead, a 
culture internalizes the hegemonic construct, so that it 
becomes a part of what is perceived as natural. The 
concepts or beliefs, in addition, must involve some 
distortion of reality, in that we are led to believe in 
certain values and beliefs which may ultimately lead to 
false promises. Although we are not misled intentionally, 
hegemony does have an exact consequence. It acts to 
preserve the status quo of the dominant class, to ward off 
change, and to keep the society as it is. 
Thus, the infiltration of hegemony into our lives is a 
process of which many of us are unaware. We sometimes 
accept particular social, moral, and political values and do 
not question how they come to be a part of our existence. 
Instead, we take them as common knowledge and even 
incorporate words for them into our language so that the 
mores seem natural, a supposedly inescapable part of our 
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days on earth. We usually do not take the time to evaluate 
critically what we do, say, and think, just as we can be 
unaware of how the dominant class and State bring about a 
certain system of values to justify and legitimate the 
differences within the class structure. 
My decision to include my personal experiences as a 
critical dimension of this research originates from an 
assumption that my consciousness is intertwined with the 
thought structures of others. Such a procedure is not 
narcissistic but, rather, pertains to the commonality among 
human beings. By critically examining myself as an example 
of a female Southern educator, I can start to disclose some 
of the conflicts and dialectics which we face in our 
relationships. I learn more about myself and, consequently, 
discover the similarities and differences of other people in 
a back-and-forth exchange between the self and other. In 
order to be human, I broaden my self-knowledge to include 
others, for "to be means to be with other human beings" 
(Heschel, 1965, p. 45). 
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CHAPTER I 
A FOUNDATION OF THEORIES OF RELATIONSHIPS 
Introduction 
This chapter forms an overall framework for 
relationships by combining selected parts of various 
theories into one larger theory. It is essential for 
praxis—practice critically based on theory—to have a 
theoretical foundation against which to reference 
experiences (Freire, 1986). Otherwise, we do not have a 
measuring stick for our experiences. With a theory in 
place, we can hold and examine our experiences in light of 
it, and it against our experiences, so that the theory 
serves as a shaper of our experiential interpretations. 
Each influences the other in praxis, when we critically 
reflect on our actions and thoughts to join theory with 
practice. 
When we think of relationships, we have in mind certain 
connotations. We visualize a unity, one of people with 
nature, people with people, or perhaps people with God. 
Recognition of the other person, thing, or deity is a 
prerequisite, for we must bring him, her, or it into our 
consciousness with some sense of connection: 
He perceives the being that surrounds him, plain things 
and beings as things; he perceives what happens around 
him, plain processes and actions as processes, things 
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that consist of qualities and processes that consist of 
moments, things recorded in terms of spatial 
coordinates and processes recorded in terms of temporal 
coordinates, things and processes that are bounded by 
other things and processes and capable of being 
measured against and compared with those others. . . Or 
man encounters being and becoming as what confronts 
him—always only one being and every thing only as a 
being. What is there reveals itself to him in the 
occurrence, and what occurs there happens to him as 
being. (Buber, 1970, pp. 82-83) 
Hence, we are separate beings who interact with others, for 
we are one among many. We know ourselves by knowing others, 
our lives interdependent upon the lives of others. Being 
human, thus, necessitates relationships (Heschel, 1965) 
where we reach out to others. 
Because of the person I am, the writings of certain 
theorists appeal to me. Their work helps me to come to 
terms with myself, as well as to formulate my own theory of 
relationships, made up from bits, pieces, and 
interpretations of their theories. All in all, their work 
fits together, each theorist adding another facet to the 
dialectic of theory and practice. 
I have chosen Buber's theory because of its 
distinctions among types of relationships and its spiritual 
component. I do not choose to center totally on Buber 
because my experiences extend to additional domains. I have 
been selective about the portions of Buber I prefer in the 
composition of my overall theoretical referent, with the 
main criterion of inclusion or exclusion being my 
experiential base. Consequently, I am drawn to other 
7 
theorists to help me understand my position in life and with 
others. 
Similarly, due to my educational studies and my 
teaching experiences, I am pulled to the writings of 
critical theorists, as illustrated primarily by those of 
Paulo Freire. He provides a theory of relationship between 
teacher and student from a political perspective, in 
addition to conceptualizing a methodology for a 
transformative and liberating education. His works furnish 
a way of explaining everyday relations with students. His 
concept of oppressor-oppressed is very beneficial in 
understanding students and the role of teacher, because the 
manner of instruction can determine the learning which 
occurs and the amount of knowledge shared. If a teacher 
assumes power while students sit passively listening, then 
he or she dominates over them in a hierarchy. He or she 
treats them as objects, not as subjects, in an oppressive 
fashion (Freire, 1986). On the other hand, if he or she 
sees them as subjects, the relationship can change into one 
of subject meeting subject, and a liberative, problem-posing 
education can replace the former stifling hierarchy. Praxis 
becomes the key to an authentic education, the condition 
where: 
Liberation is a praxis: the action and reflection of 
men upon their world in order to transform it. Those 
truly committed to the cause of liberation can accept 
neither the mechanistic concept of consciousness as an 
empty vessel to be filled, nor the use of banking 
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methods of domination (propaganda, slogans—deposits) 
in the name of liberation. (Freire, 1986, p. 66) 
Thus, relationships and praxis are vital to me, as a teacher 
committed to the quality of education and welfare of 
students. 
Finally, I have chosen Sharon Welch as an example of a 
feminist liberation theologian who helps me to consider 
relations from a woman's point to view. She has undergone 
some of the struggles of being a woman in a world that 
politically and economically favors the male, so that she 
has felt the friction in being both oppressed and oppressor. 
She combines the dialectics in explaining the behavior of an 
individual person and does not separate them into two 
categories of people. Her writing, as a result, builds 
another layer onto Buber1s and Freire1s theories of 
relationship and supplies additional room for a connection 
between my experiences and theory. 
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Section 1; 
Martin Buber's Theory of Relationships 
Introduction 
The writings of Buber provide me with insight into the 
complexities and paradoxes of human relationships and human 
connections with nature and the super-natural. Although his 
work cannot fully explain the intricacies of existence, I 
can benefit from reflection on it, for my readings of his 
philosophy lead me to a deeper understanding of my own 
relations with the world. It serves for me as a mainstay 
against which I can reference my thoughts and experiences. 
Buber's Theory 
For Buber (1958), relationships occur in three 
domains, namely between people and nature, people and 
people, and people and the Eternal Thou, or God. These 
relationships form our existence (Buber, 1970, p. 53), for 
we continually define our world in terms of other beings. 
They compose our world, and it is in the process of placing 
one structure of being in comparison to a living being where 
we come to see ourselves in terms of the other. Our human 
constitution makes it essential that we relate to the 
people, world, and spirit around us. 
Our connection with nature is inherent, for just as our 
parents are a part and product of nature, so too are we 
(Buber, 1970, pp. 76-77). We share the space around us with 
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the elements which combine to form us. We perceive the 
birds, trees, animals, and so on, as to how they relate to 
us. Our senses gather data to bring the environment into 
existence for us. We see the branches-swaying in the wind, 
or the bird feeding its young only as we, through our 
senses, attend to them (Buber, 1965b). Such aspects of 
nature are held at a distance from us, so that they become 
distinct and separate from us. In this distancing process, 
we acknowledge their being and allow for a relationship with 
them (Buber, 1965b). Despite how we may view them, as 
objects for manipulation or unification, we rely upon their 
being for our being and world: 
An animal in the realm of its perceptions is like a 
fruit in its skin; man is, or can be, in the world as a 
dweller in an enormous building which is always being 
added to, and to whose limits he can never penetrate, 
but which he can nevertheless know as one does know a 
house in which one lives—for he is capable of grasping 
the wholeness of the building as such. Man is like 
this because he is the creature (Viesen) through whose 
being (Sein) 'what is' (das Seiende) becomes detached 
from him, and recognized for itself. It is only the 
realm which is removed, lifted out from sheer presence, 
withdrawn from the operation of needs and wants, set at 
a distance and thereby given over to itself, which is 
more and other than a realm. Only when a structure of 
being is independently over against a living being 
(Seiende), an independent opposite, does a world exist. 
(Buber, 1965b, p. 61) 
The unification with nature comes from a special type 
of relationship with it. We enter into the I-Thou domain 
when our consciousness ceases to attend to the separateness 
between us and the object of the environment. For example, 
we can contemplate a tree until it ceases to be an object, 
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or an It. We no longer attend to the unique elements of the 
tree, as its branches, leaves, bark, or form, but instead, 
we see the tree as a whole. In its entirety, the tree 
merges with us, and we, in turn merge with it. We are, 
hence, drawn into a possible relation with nature which 
exists only "if will and grace are joined" (Buber, 1970, p. 
58). We do not seek for such a relationship; it occurs in 
the presence of reciprocity. 
The I-Thou relation with nature is "the most 
misunderstood and most often criticized part of Buber's I-
Thou philosophy" (Friedman, 1955, p. 169). The sticky part 
for comprehension centers around reciprocity and mutuality, 
which are essential for an I-Thou relationship (Buber, 
1958). The tree does not have a consciousness, as we 
understand the word. Rather, we tend to think of a tree as 
an object with unique characteristics. When we note its 
distinctiveness, we put it into the It category. We usually 
associate "person" with other people, who have minds and 
bodies as we do. Similarly, we apply most often the pronoun 
"I" to denote a human subject and not something as a tree, 
which we label as an "it" in our language. 
I see the I-Thou relationship with nature, though, as 
extending beyond language. Happening in the present moment, 
the tree goes beyond being merely an object and becomes a 
reflection of my consciousness. I must be in a certain 
frame of mind in order to be open to engaging in a relation 
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with nature. In this state of consciousness, I cease to 
perceive the uniqueness of the tree which becomes no longer 
comparable to the things around it. Instead, it exists as 
it is. It becomes a subject to me through my consciousness. 
It "becomes my Thou, but I cannot be a Thou for it" 
(Friedman, 1955, p. 170). Reciprocity, such as I may 
experience through another human being, cannot manifest 
itself in an I-Thou relation with nature. Rather, an I-Thou 
relation with a tree is a modification of an I-Thou with 
another human being. 
In the relations of people to people, the "world is 
twofold in accordance with his twofold attitude" (Buber, 
1970, p. 53). The twofoldness encompasses man's and woman's 
attitudes towards reality, for their world comes to be one 
of a "great duality of human life" (Kaufmann, 1980, p. 99). 
Their days are divided into relations of either an I-It or 
an I-Thou quality, which compose the "basic words" (Buber, 
1970, p. 53) of existence. The I-Thou relation extends not 
only to nature but also to other people and to God. Below I 
will deal with it and the contrasting I-It realm in relation 
to other people. 
The I-It domain is that of experience and use (Buber, 
1958). It is presented to us through words as "it," "she," 
and "he." They are objects, from which we can gain 
information and knowledge. We are aware of their usefulness 
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to us. Whenever we observe, classify, perceive, apply, and 
the like, we are experiencing the It world. 
The relation of I-It does not encompass our whole 
being, only a part of us. It is a subject-object encounter 
where each action is directed towards a specific, desired 
goal (Buber, 1970, p. 54). We act purposefully and not 
spontaneously. We objectify the world in time, space, and 
cause-effect terms. Searching for stability, we predict 
what will occur if we combine element X with Y. Each moment 
is planned. As a result, we can easily forget about the 
mystery of life because we delude ourselves into believing 
that we can predict, order, and manipulate factors around 
us. We create a secure existence through the world of I-It 
and do not undergo the directness, intensity, presentness, 
and mutuality of an I-Thou. We, hence, sacrifice the 
discovery of much of our meaning as people existing on earth 
and interconnected with one another. 
Still, we cannot escape living in an I-It world. To do 
so is a necessity for human existence. Unless we use the 
things and people around us, we cannot overcome our inherent 
limitations as humans. We need reliability, predictability, 
and order to exist from day to day. Buber (1970) 
acknowledges the essentialness of the I-It relation, for the 
world around us is one where objective knowledge takes 
precedence over subjective knowledge. People whQ live only 
in the I-It realm limit themselves in their relationships. 
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Although their lives become ordered, their human potential 
is not achieved. They experience a life of aloneness, one 
that is not totally free but restricted by their relations 
in the I-It domain. 
Contrastingly, the I-Thou words "can only be spoken 
with one's whole being" (Buber, 1970, p. 54). We are then 
aware of the other as a subject and not as an object. We 
leave the objective position for the subjective, because we 
are in contact with being itself, not parts of being. This 
relation has a different basis that cannot be experienced 
consciously. Once we acknowledge the relationship, it 
changes from a Thou into an It. The person who was a 
subject to us now becomes an object again, a "he", "she", or 
"it" who is encompassed by others. 
We can only undergo an I-Thou union in the present and 
not in the past, for "the present arises only in virtue of 
the fact that the Thou becomes present" (Buber, 1958, p. 
12). Our awareness of time and space ceases, where the now 
moment makes up the full encounter with life. At this time 
we are not conscious of our differences to one another but 
celebrate the commonality of our beings joined through the 
I-Thou union. The relation occurs in the context of here 
and now, for once we begin to reflect upon the occurrence, 
we change from the I-Thou relation to the I-It. We shift 
from the moment of acceptance of the other to an.awareness 
of time and, hence, of the past. We confirm who we are in 
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the moments of the relation. We share the state of 
betweenness by our potential to relate in an I-Thou: 
I affirm the person I struggle with: I struggle with 
him as his partner, I confirm him as creature and as 
creation, I confirm him who is opposed to me as him who 
is over against me. It is true that it now depends on 
the other whether genuine dialogue, mutuality in speech 
arises between us. But if I thus give to the other who 
confronts me his legitimate standing as a man with whom 
I am ready to enter into dialogue, then I may trust him 
and suppose him to be also ready to deal with me as his 
partner. (Buber, 1965b, pp. 79-80) 
To increase the unpredictability and unreliability of 
an I-Thou experience, every I-Thou turns into an I-It, while 
an I-It may emerge into an I-Thou: 
But this is the exalted melancholy of our fate, that 
every Thou in our world must become an It. It does not 
matter how exclusively present the Thou was in the 
direct relation. As soon as the relation has been 
worked out or has been permeated with a means, the Thou 
becomes an object among objects—perhaps the chief", 
but still one of them, fixed in its size and its 
limits. . . .The particular Thou, after the relational 
event has run its course, is bound to become an It. 
The particular It, by entering the relational event, 
may become a Thou. (Buber, 1958, pp. 16-17, 33) 
One type of relation can, thus, be transformed into the 
other, and vice versa. No set of conditions serves as a 
prerequisite for the switching from an I-It to an I-Thou, 
except that we have a consciousness open to the encounter. 
The rest is left to grace, where we recognize the partner as 
an "I" in a subject-to-subject union. The return to the I-
It world signifies the continuance of our everyday life, but 
the I-Thou prepares us for future relations between us and 
the other: 
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Between you and it there is mutual giving; you say Thou 
to it and give yourself to it, it says Thou to you and 
gives itself to you. You cannot make yourself 
understood with others concerning it, you are alone 
with it. But it teaches you to meet others, and to 
hold your ground when you meet them. Through the 
graciousness of its comings and the solemn sadness of 
its goings it leads you away to the Thou in which the 
parallel lines of relations meet. It does not help to 
sustain you in life, it only helps you to glimpse 
eternity. (Buber, 1958, p. 33) 
It must be understood that when we talk of an I-Thou 
state, we modify it into an I-It. We must objectify it in 
order to describe it, so that by the distancing and 
consciousness we make it into an I-It. Even Buber, in his 
classic work I and Thou (1958, 1970), alters the thou-ness 
to an it-ness. No one can retell of his or her experiences 
with Thou without the transformation. 
Buber sees us, as men and women, meeting one another 
in the area of the between when we confirm each other 
through our dialogical relationship: 
But when two individuals 'happen1 to each other, then 
there is an essential remainder which is common to 
them, but which reaches out beyond the special sphere 
of each. That remainder is the basic reality, the 
•sphere of between'. . .The participation of both 
partners is in principle indispensable to this sphere, 
whether the reciprocity be fully actual or directly 
capable of being realized through completion or 
intensification. The unfolding of this sphere Buber 
calls 'the dialogical.* (Friedman, 1955, p. 85) 
Hence, the dialogical is the point for understanding the 
meaning of our existence. It is the acceptance of our true 
humanity, confirming each other as we are. We are revealed 
as ourselves in the genuine dialogue, as our "I" says Thou. 
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We seek one another through our commonalities and 
specialness, where we each turn to the other bound in 
dialogue. All of our life is meeting, as we face each other 
in dialogue. 
In the sphere of the between we recognize the 
responsibility of realizing our humanity. If we wish to be 
whole, then we must be open and responsive to the encounter 
with the other. Part of this openness involves 
authenticity, or genuineness. When we are authentic, 
according to Buber (1965a), we are aware of what really is 
and not what appears to be. The former comes from our 
essence, our true humanity, while the latter originates as 
the image, what we seem to be (Friedman, 1955, p. 85). As 
with I-Thou and I-It relations, we become a mixture of 
essence and image. Still, some of us become more in line 
with our essence, just as others are more concerned with 
their appearances (Buber, 1965b, pp. 75-76). When we give 
ourselves to the beholder openly, spontaneously, and without 
affectation, we exemplify ourselves as we are, our essences. 
If we are consumed with a sense of what other people say 
about us or see ourselves as they see us, then we are more 
of an image person. Inauthenticity results in cases where 
we act to gain the approval of the partner or where we seem 
to be what we are not (Buber, 1965b, p. 78). Without 
authenticity, we cannot share a genuine dialogue. Rather, 
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we show the problem existing in the between, that of being 
and appearing. 
Although Buber (1965a) talks about the need for 
authenticity in a genuine dialogue, I hold, as I believe 
Buber intends, that authenticity as a product does not 
really exist. When we think that we are authentic, we are 
not authentic. Instead, we are concerned with the thought 
of authenticity. It becomes something for which we can 
strive, but in the seeking we put it further from ourselves, 
like the I-Thou relationship. Rather than thinking of 
authenticity as a character trait, I like to see it in terms 
of an authenticating act. This does exist and is something 
which we can experience (Friedman, 1974, p. 21). Perhaps 
our life is composed of moments of authenticating actions, 
combined with actions which are not authenticating. Such a 
mixture parallels our milieu of essence with image to make 
up our being. 
We may, moreover, engage in either silence or speech in 
a genuine dialogue, characterized by a state where: 
. . . each of the participants really has in mind the 
other or others in their present and particular being 
and turns to them with the intention of establishing a 
living mutual relation between himself and them. 
(Buber, 1965a, p. 19) 
That is to say, we reach out to our partner, and he or she 
turns to us in a mutual need for relation. We take each 
other as we are in the present moment, both of us intending 
to participate in a relationship. Our partner cannot become 
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just a facet of our experience, for if this occurs, then we 
are only deluding ourselves of a true dialogue. There is, 
in such an occurrence, no real care or concern. We are 
involved in a monologue, under the guise of a dialogue, 
which ultimately reaffirms us and our positions of self-
centeredness. 
Thus, not evsry dialogue may be a genuine one. It may 
be, on one hand, a monologue: 
disguised as a dialogue, in which two or more men, 
meeting in space, speak each with himself in strangely 
tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have 
escaped the torment of being thrown back on their 
resources. (Buber, 1965a, p. 19) 
It can also be a technical dialogue, where the wish is to 
gain objective knowledge, or it can be a debate, marked by 
people competitively trying to match wits with other people. 
Spontaneity and authenticity are not that important here, 
for the participants demonstrate the I-It quality of our 
technical, modern existence. The opponents come to be 
viewed not as people but as objects against whom to score. 
All of the above types of dialogue are very common but 
differ from a genuine one. They are, instead, the ones in 
which "you [do not] have much to do with men, but one[s] in 
which you really have to do with those with whom you have to 
do" (Buber, 1965a, p. 20). 
As implied by its terminology, monologue does not 
extend beyond the self (Buber, 1965a, p. 20). Wei turn 
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inward to ourselves rather than reaching out to another. We 
undergo reflexion, the same in monologue as when: 
. . . man withdraws from accepting with his essential 
being another person in his particularity—a 
particularity which is by no means to be circumscribed 
by the circle of his own self, and though it 
substantially touches and moves his soul is in no way 
immanent in it—and lets the other exist only as his 
own experience, only as a 'part of myself1. (Buber, 
1965a, pp. 23-24) 
Consequently, we are centered on ourselves in monologues in 
such a way that we see only our viewpoint or perspective and 
not that of our fellow neighbors. We live within ourselves 
and limit the interrelatedness of our existence. 
Both monologue and dialogue include solitude, the time 
we spend by ourselves. The differing point between the two 
becomes whether we remain throughout our life alone (Buber, 
1965a, p. 20). For dialogue, we sometimes need the time by 
ourselves to examine our experiences and to get in touch 
with ourselves in terms of our connections. We can withdraw 
from others, and from this withdrawal we are able to 
continue our old relations or enter into new ones. Our time 
in dialogues is not spent totally involved with the self; we 
have time alone in order to relate better with others as 
well as with the self, whereas in monologue solitude becomes 
an enclosing period rather than the start towards a 
liberating one. We are so involved with ourselves that we 
structure our world until a state of betweenness does not 
exist for us. We fail to perceive events from other 
viewpoints and, as a result, exist in an egocentric state. 
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With our world revolving around the self, we experience life 
in a different fashion than if we participate in genuine 
dialogue with others. We do not come to have the same depth 
to our life by closing the door on others. 
As a result, the presence and absence of genuine 
dialogue and monologue bear a direct influence upon our 
relationships, for "all real living is meeting" (Buber, 
1958, p. 12). We either turn towards one another or put up 
a barrier against the occurrence of special moments to 
celebrate our connectedness. We set people and th«ings at a 
distance, as well as come closer in order to relate to them. 
We employ both dialectics in the complex fashioning of our 
humanity. 
In distancing and relating, Buber holds that distancing 
comes before relating, for when we set a person or object at 
a distance, we perceive him, her, or it as an other (Buber, 
1965b, p. 60). The person or object, hence, becomes 
separate from us. He, she, or it becomes like us in that we 
are all part of the same world, yet we also recognize the 
differences. Only in the separating process of one from the 
other, where we differentiate ourselves from one another, 
does a world independent from ourselves exist. We are set 
apart from the environment, although we do not always enter 
into a relation with what or whom we have placed at a 
distance. Rather, it is through this distancing process 
where a sense of the "I" emerges (Buber, 1965b, p. 63). 
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A person, hence, must possess a definite sense of an I, 
as well as an independent other, before he or she can enter 
into relations. Distancing is necessary for relating, 
because "man becomes an I through a You" (Buber, 1970, p. 
80). For this reason, an embryo, who does not know a life 
apart from his or her mother, cannot experience an I-Thou 
relationship. He or she does not have a distinct self where 
he or she can distinguish the self from the mother. 
Instead, his or her life in the womb is fully dependent upon 
the mother's existence. His or her prenatal existence is 
where one experiences: 
pure natural association , a flowing toward each 
other, a bodily reciprocity; and the life horizon of 
the developing being appears uniquely inscribed, and 
yet also not inscribed, in that of the being that 
carries it. . . (Buber, 1970, p. 76) 
Without a conscious recognition of the individual self, we 
cannot share in the reality resulting from relations (Buber, 
1958, p. 63). 
Thus, Buber views relationships between people as being 
in the I-It and I-Thou domains. Only in the I-Thou relation 
do we realize our humanity in the present, just as in 
genuine dialogue do we reach towards the other with the 
intention of mutuality. Imbedded in both I-Thou and genuine 
dialogue are the acceptance, affirmation, and confirmation 
which we need to be and become our human selves. We live 
within the tension of the self and the other, distancing and 
relating in a dialectic world. Sadly, though, our world is 
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becoming more I-It, with manipulation, use, and 
objectification of the other evidenced. We are becoming 
more and more impersonal, as we observe and criticize those 
persons around us: 
In our age the I-It relation gigantically swollen, has 
usurped, practically uncontested, the mastery and the 
rule. The I of this relation, an I that possesses all, 
makes all, succeeds with all, this I that is unable to 
say Thou, unable to meet a being essentially, is the 
lord of the hour. This selfhood that has become 
omnipotent, with all the It around it, can naturally 
acknowledge neither God nor any genuine absolute which 
manifests itself to men as of non-human origin. It 
steps in between and shuts off from us the light of 
heaven. (Buber, 1957, p. 129) 
While the relations we have with people and nature must 
always enter into the I-It area, only our ties with God, the 
Eternal Thou, deny the It quality (Buber, 1970, p. 121) . He 
or She is always Thou: 
The eternal Thou can by its nature not become It; for 
by its nature it cannot be established in measure and 
bounds, not even in the measure of the immeasurable, or 
the bounds of boundless being; for by its nature it 
cannot be understood as a sum of qualities, not even as 
an infinite sum of qualities raised to a transcendental 
level; for it can be found neither in nor out of the 
world; for it cannot be experienced or thought; for we 
miss Him, Him who is, if we say "I believe that He is"— 
"He" is also a metaphor, but "Thou" is not. (Buber, 
1958, p. 112) 
He or She is continually present, a Being whom we can 
address but cannot depict (Buber, 1958, p. 112). The 
symbols and representations of God are only symbols; they 
are not God. Similarly, when we think of God in metaphors, 
we are not in contact with Him or Her. We are in touch with 
the metaphors. Even the labelling of God by name—Spirit, 
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Being, God, or the Unknown—removes us from Him or Her, for 
all such designations are products of our thought (Kohanski, 
1982, p. 98), where we are able to deal with a concept of 
God. Still, as we try to understand Buber's philosophy of 
the Eternal Thou, God is not a concept. He or She is beyond 
comprehension (Buber, 1958, p. 112). 
We experience the actuality of His or Her presence when 
we undergo the thou-ness of another. In fact, we cannot 
encounter God except through our relations (Buber, 1970, p. 
123). We meet with a partner, both subjects as independent 
beings engaging in the reciprocity and wholeness of an I-
Thou. In those special moments of the present, we meet with 
God in the between that we have structured through our 
relationships. The I-Thou experience becomes a prerequisite 
for an I-Eternal Thou meeting. 
Nevertheless, I see that our I-Thou relations are not 
totally the same as our I-Eternal Thou ones. We meet as a 
finite and limited being with another finite being as we go 
forth into an I-Thou. We see the other as an object before 
and after the encounter, so that we change from an I-Thou to 
an I-It and vice versa. When we enter the absolute 
relationship of the I-Eternal Thou, however, we participate 
in a partnership composed of a finite being with an infinite 
Being. God does not become an object before or after but, 
instead, is continually present. We accept His or Her Being 
completely, as: 
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God is the 'wholly other1; but he is also the wholly 
same: the wholly present. Of course, he is the 
mvsterium tremendum that appears and overwhelms; but he 
is also the mystery of the obvious that is closer to me 
than my own I. (Buber, 1970, p. 127) 
When we come into a relation with the Eternal Thou, we 
must do so with our whole, being (Buber,1958). We cannot 
meet Him or Her with anything less. Our body, spirit, mind, 
experiences, and so on must be unified into one, as we are 
fragmented in our I-It encounters (Buber, 1970, p. 54). We 
must overcome this element of fragmentation; otherwise, we 
are engaged partially in a meeting and are not relating with 
God. We are not experiencing the renewal of our being but, 
rather, existing in belief of an It. 
God does not reveal Himself or Herself except in His or 
Her relation to people (Buber, 1958, pp. 116-117). We 
cannot know God until we relate to Him or Her. His or Her 
revelation is centered on our world and time, not the world 
beyond ours. We cannot escape our fellow people and the 
world; it is through them that we come to God. In other 
words, just as we accept the world which He or She created, 
we must accept the Creator. From our meeting with the 
Eternal Thou, we can go forth to our neighbors with a 
hallowing of our mortal life (Buber, 1958, p. 79). 
Buber narrates this belief in a tale. A man devoted to 
God comes to the gates of mystery and is told to return to 
the world of men and women: 
From within came the cry: "What do you want here?" He 
said, "I have proclaimed your praise in the ears of 
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mortals, but they were deaf to me. So I come to you 
that you yourself may hear me and reply." "Turn back," 
came the cry from within. "Here is no ear for you. I 
have sunk my hearing in the deafness of mortals." 
(Buber, 1965a, p. 15) 
On the whole, we cannot just concern ourselves with God 
and overlook the problems and joys of other people. Even 
though we feel called to God, we must not become so overly 
involved with Him or Her that we deny our fellow men and 
women. A paradox results, where as we become more genuinely 
human through our relation to the Eternal Thou, we also 
stand the chance of becoming more inhuman in our dealing 
with people. Likewise, while we become more vulnerable in 
our existence in a state of epoche, we are at risk of 
becoming more closed. We can become closer to God but more 
distant from Him or Her in our forgetfulness of the world 
around us. We are cautioned that "those who may be called 
true human beings are time and again in danger of slipping 
into inhumanity" (Buber, 1963, p. 242). 
We are faced with responsibility as we are drawn closer 
to the world and to God. We must assume responsibility for 
other men, women, and children, just as we must care for the 
fate of our environment (Buber, 1958). We must enter into 
genuine dialogue and relations with all around us, as much 
as we can. Although the world of the I-It still exists, we 
can go towards the maximum realization of our reality. Our 
life should be so full of relations that they become a 
"shining streaming constancy" (Buber, 1958, pp. 114-115). 
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In this way, our I-Thou and I-Eternal Thou encounters are 
not like the occasional glimpses of light but are similar to 
the "rising moon in a clear starlit night" (Buber, 1958, pp. 
114-115). 
According to Buber, if we look for God, we will not 
find Him or Her (Buber, 1958, p. 80). Instead, we will 
become distant from Him or Her because of our efforts. We 
will locate Him or Her without the search, as God is in all 
realms of our life. There is nothing which escapes His or 
Her presence. Due to this omnipresence, we should go forth 
into the world with an openness and reverence for God's 
creations. Otherwise, we see men and women, even God, as 
articles for profit and manipulation. Such an I-It attitude 
negates our genuine acceptance of other human beings and of 
God. We are left godless, because we deny our humanity 
(Buber, 1958, p. 107). 
Buber's path to genuineness is filled with 
vulnerability and risks (Moore, 1973, p.184). In the 
openness needed for I-Eternal Thou and I-Thou encounters, we 
shed the protective veneers and prejudices behind which we 
often hide. We must face the world as the persons we are. 
There is no guarantee as to whether or not our openness will 
be reciprocated or even as to how others will respond to us. 
Instead, we proceed without the sureness of factuality, 
without the certitude that we will step just far enough on 
the "narrow ridge" (Buber, 1965a) where we find ourselves. 
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Hence, in Buber's explanation of our meetings with the 
I-Eternal Thou, we have the purest and most absolute of 
relationships. We must come to God in total acceptance of 
Him or Her and in a full participation in the life around 
us. At the same time, He or She is incomprehensible, but we 
are certain of His or Her existence because He or She is 
always present in everything we know and do not know. He or 
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She is present in our everyday world and in the not-so-
common occurrences, so that we are answerable to God for our 
actions and for the assumption of our responsibility. There 
can never be a substitute for us in our relations to the 
Eternal Thou or for other people in their connection to God. 
Each of us has a unique relation with God. We cannot be 
freed from our responsibility for ourselves, for others, for 
the world, for God, and for their unification. 
Buber presents us with a profound theory of 
relationships which has much appeal to it. We can accept it 
fully or not, just as we are free to be selective and put 
more belief in some parts of it more so than in others. 
Other theorists offer us different theories about relations. 
They explore directions other than Buber's I-It, I-Thou, and 
I-Eternal Thou concepts. When we examine the work of Paulo 
Freire and Sharon Welch, we can perceive some problematics 
within Buber's thoughts in light of our present-day society. 
29 
Section 2: 
Paulo Freire and Sharon Welch 
Introduction 
Theorists who construct varying explanations about 
relations supply us with other rationales about our 
connections. Paulo Freire--along with a number of other 
social theorists, particularly Gramsci—expresses methods 
for critical consciousness and empowerment, while Sharon 
Welch concerns herself with the dialectics of liberation in 
an oppressive society. Their theories support somewhat 
differing positions about how we fit into our lives with 
others and with God, while a comparison among some of their 
major themes illustrates how we piece together and 
critically approach the theories of others before we reshape 
the explanations to fit our experiences. 
Theories of Oppression 
More specifically, Freire considers the role of 
education as a political factor. Education, as I use the 
term, extends beyond the process of schooling and 
encompasses learning inside as well as outside of the 
classroom walls. Because a large part of Freire's work 
involves adult literacy, he also sees education in a broad 
context. Words as teacher and student stand for both the 
usual roles in school, in addition to the giving or sharing 
of knowledge in society as a whole. The relationships which 
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result between a teacher and student, or oppressor and 
oppressed, are ones occurring in our everyday life, where 
schooling parallels our society. 
Writing about landowners and peasants in his homeland 
Brazil, Freire concerns himself with showing how some people 
are dehumanized in .the dual states of oppressors and 
oppressed. The oppressors use and manipulate other people; 
they deny the oppressed a full expression of their rights as 
human beings. Similarly, the oppressed, through their 
passivity, support the oppressors and even go so far as to 
strengthen the curtailment of their rights. The oppressed 
tend to think of themselves as below the oppressors, within 
a metaphor of a vertical hierarchy. The oppressed work for 
the oppressors; the peasants serve the landowners. 
The oppressors perceive the variation in power as 
natural and, to maintain the status quo, promote actions 
which will undergird their positions. They were taught as 
children and will pass on to their children that the 
oppressed do not have the same ability "to think, to want, 
and to know" (Freire, 1986, p. 46) which the oppressors 
supposedly possess. Consequently, the oppressors have 
prejudices and beliefs about the oppressed which must be 
overcome if true liberation is to actualize. Both the 
oppressors and the oppressed have internalized the hegemonic 
ideology which wards off change and keeps the society as it 
is, freezing the power relationships in a position of 
stasis. The power variations of the oppressors and 
oppressed, likewise, exemplify hegemony at work. 
Still, hegemony rests on how the State and the dominant 
class in a society establish their values and beliefs as 
cultural norms (Gramsci, 1971). A type of social control, 
it manifests itself in certain ways both externally and 
internally, as we are rewarded and punished in our day-to­
day experiences in a molding and fashioning of our 
personalities. Then, certain values and beliefs of the 
State and of the more powerful groups are introduced into 
our consciousness, so that our thoughts legitimate as 
natural the existence of the oppressors—the upper class— 
and the chasm separating the power and income levels. By 
influencing both the internal and external, hegemony becomes 
a type of ideological process largely in the interests of 
perpetuating the survival of the upper echelons. We accept, 
just like our ancestors, the relation of the capitalistic 
production with the upper class. We learn from birth how 
money and resources connote power and that only a few 
individuals have access to the wealth in society. We do not 
question the unequal distribution of goods where the rich 
have and the poor have not. Instead, we tend to take at 
face value the hierarchical structure of classes like the 
oppressors and oppressed that are reinforced by the 
hegemonic ideology. 
Of course, in order to have upper class oppressors, 
there must be other class levels with which to compare and 
establish their existence. The terms upper and lower, as 
oppressors and oppressed. imply a hierarchical order where 
the higher is dominant and the lower is subordinate. Yet, 
we supposedly are a society where every individual is equal 
and has access to equal opportunity (Karier, 1972). If all 
of us start at the same point, the fact that we may end up 
at different points purportedly shows how hard work and 
effort can affect the outcome. We all know, however, that 
we do not begin at the same base; some people have greater 
access to property and resources than others. Because of 
the availability to resources, the richer possess more power 
and can provide jobs for people in the oppressed lower 
classes, to allow the working class members to accumulate 
goods and to provide for their needs: 
In their unrestrained eagerness to possess, the 
oppressors develop the conviction that it is possible 
for them to transform everything into objects of their 
purchasing power; hence their strictly materialistic 
concept of existence. Money is the measure of all 
things, and profit the primary goal. For the 
oppressors, what is worthwhile is to have more—always 
more—even at the cost of the oppressed having less or 
having nothing. For them, to be is to have and to be 
the class of the "haves." (Freire, 1986, p. 44) 
The oppressed must still in some way consent to the 
domination of the oppressors. They must allow or 
acknowledge the authority of persons over them and, thus, 
support their own subordination. They must make "some 
degree of conscious attachment, or agreement with, certain 
core elements of the society" (Femia, 1981, p. 38). Due to 
the internalization of the values and norms of the 
oppressors, hegemony becomes a part of the consciousness and 
paves the way for allowing a particular allocation of scarce 
goods, for how much dissent to permit, and for how 
institutions can make decisions upholding the allocations. 
The oppressed accept their positions and through their 
conformity strengthen the class barriers which keep them 
from change and a transformation of reality. 
Even when the oppressors bestow gifts upon the 
oppressed, the generosity becomes only a token. In fact, it 
illumines unjust social order (Freire, 1986, p. 46). One 
can show his or her greater wealth or supposed superiority 
to those politically inferior to himself or herself through 
the giving. The generosity, resultingly, becomes an agent 
of the hegemonic structure. It puts the acceptors in their 
places and does little to modify the consciousness of the 
oppressors. Without an alteration of the way the dominant 
class thinks, social injustice will surely remain. 
Likewise, the oppressed also have a certain 
consciousness in which they undervalue themselves and their 
knowledge. They become convinced of their inferiority 
because they frequently hear "that they are good for 
nothing, know nothing and are incapable of learning 
anything—that they are sick, lazy, and unproductive" 
(Freire, 1986, p. 49). After a time, they picture 
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themselves as unequal to the landowner. For the oppressed, 
the differences in political power and wealth seem to point 
to their unworthiness. While they lack confidence in 
themselves and fail to recognize the preciousness and 
essentialness of their existence as people, the oppressed 
further their oppression and dehumanization. A change in 
their consciousness, as for the oppressors, is essential for 
liberation. They must acknowledge their exploitation and 
oppression. From this admission comes a sense of 
empowerment. 
Teachers and students demonstrate the positions of the 
oppressed and oppressors, because the instructor is the 
dominant figure in a classroom most of the time. He or she 
usually has control over the plan and method of instruction, 
in addition to the execution of the parcelling out of 
knowledge to the students. A teacher can decide when and to 
whom to dole out the gift of information to the waiting 
students. They, in turn, tend not to question the 
distribution of power but, instead, passively do as 
instructed. The teacher plays the role of authority figure 
and the students, in general, condone and even expect to be 
under his or her control, so that when we speak of 
oppressor-oppressed, we can frequently substitute teacher-
student . 
Thus, some of the oppressed have incorporated the 
beliefs and values of the hegemony to a degree where they do 
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not realize their oppression. They may not clearly see how 
the interests of the oppressor class are served by them and 
their actions (Freire, 1986, p. 48). Instead of resisting 
their oppression and struggling for community with others, 
they are encapsulated by a false sense of freedom that gives 
them an illusion of security. They neither question their 
position in life nor reflect critically on the occurrences 
around them. In other words, they conform to the social 
patterns and expectations and, in return, foresee a type of 
pragmatic exchange of rewards and benefits (Femia, 1981, p. 
40). For instance, they conform in order to achieve 
particular goals, needs, and wants and, in many cases, to 
avoid the unemployment lines. No other alternative promises 
the attainment of these satisfactions, such that it is often 
unwise for the oppressed not to behave in socially accepted 
ways for the landowners. A lack of critical reflection 
hides or denies the exploitation. 
Like the power and wealth bases vary for the peasants 
and landowners, their knowledges come from different social 
positions and, hence, are contrasting ways of viewing life. 
The oppressors, due to their power, tend to go more towards 
an official, popular type of knowledge (Foucault, 1980). 
After all, part of the hegemony passed to the working 
classes originates from the dominant class. The oppressed, 
on the other hand, often feel that the knowledge they 
possess is unimportant (Freire, 1973). It deviates from 
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official knowledge and, because of its variance, becomes 
subjugated. It involves histories of oppression and 
resistance, or "a whole group of knowledges that have been 
regarded with disdain by intellectuals as being either 
primitive or woefully incomplete" (Welch, 1985, p. 19). 
Thus, subjugated knowledge lies in the lives of the 
oppressed, where what they learn from their experiences is 
held to be inadequate and inferior. 
Freire notes that a large part of the subordination and 
dominance which we experience comes from the power and 
powerlessness demonstrated in the schools. The teacher, in 
the banking concept of education (Freire, 1986), strives to 
fill the students with facts and figures. Like deposits 
placed in a bank, the students are alienated from the 
material and do not identify or relate to it. They learn of 
a static reality and, therefore, experience a curriculum 
that shapes them, as the oppressed, into powerless beings. 
Because the instructor does not emphasize in his or her 
lessons that reality is actually a multi-faceted and 
continually changing process, the learning procedure steers 
the students toward an ideological distortion: 
The teacher talks about reality as if it were 
motionless, static, compartmentalized, and predictable. 
Or else he expounds on a topic completely alien to the 
existential experience of the students. His task is 
to 'fill' the students with the contents of his 
narration—contents which are detached from reality, 
disconnected from the totality that engendered them and 
could give them significance. Words are emptied of 
their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and 
alienating verbosity. (Freire, 1986, p. 57) 
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As a means of power, knowledge belongs to the educator. It 
is allocated to the students through disconnected and 
alienating courses: 
The banking concept (with its tendency to dichotomize 
everything) distinguishes two stages in the action of 
the educator. During the first, he cognizes a 
cognizable object while he prepares his lessons in his 
study or his laboratory; during the second, he expounds 
to his students about that object. The students are 
not called upon to know, but to memorize the contents 
narrated by the teacher. Nor do the students practice 
any act of cognition, since the object towards which 
that act should be directed is the property of the 
teacher rather than a medium evoking the critical 
reflection of both teacher and students. Hence in the 
name of the 'preservation of culture and knowledge1 we 
have a system which achieves neither true knowledge nor 
true culture. (Freire, 1986, pp. 67-68) 
All in all, the picture of reality about which students 
learn in schools is only a distortion. The everyday world 
they live in is not like the still-life photographs in a 
geography book. Neither do farmers produce crops smilingly 
and confidently, as the textbooks portray them, without 
anxieties of drought, falling prices, and bankruptcy. The 
citizens of the world are not all honest, upright, and just, 
and more and more children are being raised in single-parent 
homes. The Dick-and-Jane stories, with dog Spot and mother 
and father couple, are no longer applicable to every 
student. The official school knowledge does not totally 
connect with the experiences of the oppressed students 
dominated by the oppressor school. 
Proposing another method of education, Freire supports 
a problem-posing alternative. It centers around dialogue 
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between the teacher and student, where one meets the other 
as subject with subject sharing in knowledge. The teacher 
can become a student, and the student, a teacher, for each 
has some knowledge to contribute to the encounter. 
Furthermore, the problem-posing approach stimulates deep 
refection about acting upon reality and promotes inquiry 
into the present injustices around the teacher and student 
/ 
(Freire, 1973). Not presenting a static reality, it is 
continually reshaped by praxis, as critical consciousness 
and action are united in an effort for empowerment and 
transformative liberation. 
Certain components are necessary for Freire's dialogue 
to insure that it does not modify into an antidialogical and 
oppressive occurrence. First, all participants must have 
the right to speak their word, to humanize and change the 
world and to name the transformations (Freire, 1986, p. 77). 
From the naming procedure, the dialoguers acknowledge their 
connection to the world and of the world to them. They can, 
consequently, gain importance as people existing in the 
present moment. They must also live with a love of the 
world and of the people in it, for love acknowledges the 
responsibility and commitment of the subjects for each 
other. Love cannot exist with domination and oppression; it 
is an act of freedom (Freire, 1986, p. 78) . Humility comes 
with love, because arrogance and domination lead to a 
subject-object relation. The persons must address their 
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mortality with humility; yet, simultaneously, they must 
believe in and hope for their power to re-create the world 
more humanely. This faith, combined with a critical 
consciousness, cannot be blind or naive, for within it lies 
the possibility for a rebirth in the struggle for 
liberation. As a result, dialogue holds the key to a 
genuine education, where both teacher and student learn from 
each other in a liberating mode of pedagogy: 
Authentic education is not carried on by "A" for "B" or 
by "AM about "B," but rather by "A" with "B," mediated 
by the world—a world which impresses and challenges 
both parties, giving rise to views or opinions about 
it. (Freire, 1986, p. 82) 
Freire1s concept of withness suggests that people must 
work together, each with the other. The domination-
subordination relationship fades away, for as long as a 
hierarchy of power exists, men and women cannot be authentic 
people with a critical recognition of reality. A 
transformation not only occurs with the oppressed. It can 
also include the oppressors, a combination of both working 
to modify the nature of the hegemony: 
The revolution is made neither by the leaders for the 
people, nor by the people for the leaders, but by both 
acting together in unshakable solidarity. This 
solidarity is born only when the leaders witness to it 
by their humble, loving, and courageous encounter with 
the people. (Freire, 1986, p. 124) 
Hence, hegemonic power must be altered to encompass each 
individual as equal and without the subordination of the 
oppressed working class to define the oppressor. The 
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oppressed must rise socially to a medium comparable to the 
higher, a recognition as well as practice of equality. 
With a realization of their oppression, the oppressed 
must learn to think critically of the world around them. It 
is not filled with forces or knowledge beyond their 
intellects but, rather, composes their reality. They must 
perceive their own power to transform their ontologies, "to 
name the world," instead of accepting their oppression as it 
is. They, by reflecting about themselves and their lives in 
the world, cultivate the range of their perception and, 
therefore: 
develop their power to perceive critically the wav thev 
exist in the world with which and in which they find 
themselves; they come to see the world not as a static 
reality, but as a reality in process, in 
transformation. (Freire, 1986, pp. 70-71) 
Consequently, when we compare Freire's theory of 
relations with Buber's, we find that the two fit together 
well. Buber presents types of relationships and offers the 
potential height of our encounter in an I-Thou and I-Eternal 
Thou union. Freire, though, views the world around us as li­
lt, largely due to domination-subordination and the 
consequential objectification. For Freire, we cannot 
achieve an I-Thou, subject-to-subject, meeting or a genuine 
dialogue as long as we take away the humanness of others. 
Domination must have an object with lesser power. It relies 
upon the dehumanization of men and women reduced from people 
to things: 
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In the theory of antidialogical action, conquest (as 
its primary characteristic) involves a Subject who 
conquers another person and transforms him into a 
"thing." In the dialogical theory of action, Subjects 
meet in cooperation in order to transform the world. 
The antidialogical, dominating I transforms the 
dominated, conquered thou into a mere it. The 
dialogical I, however, knows that it is precisely the 
thou (not-I") which has called forth his own existence. 
He also knows that the thou which calls forth his own 
existence in turn constitutes an I which has in his I 
its thou. The I and the thou thus become, in the 
dialectic of these relationships, two thous which 
become two 11s. (Freire, 1986, p. 167) 
Freire, resultingly, portrays the world as having met 
Buber's dire prediction—that the more our world becomes I-
It in character, then the less chance for an I-Thou. His 
political dimension complements Buber's framework and 
strengthens the construction from a different way of 
explaining life.. 
I interpret both Freire's and Buber's dialogical states 
as being unattainable as long as we negate the other 
person's subjectness. Both theorists speak of a subject-to-
subject encounter, yet the fact that we live in a world 
which denies people their rights and political voices proves 
that we still dehumanize others. We fail to meet other 
people as subjects equal to us. 
Buber's dialogue, though, seems to be a high degree of 
an I-It encounter. Although the thou-ness of the other must 
be recognized and the partners meet each other as subjects, 
they are conscious of the moments together. An I-Thou 
relation occurs by will and grace but without consciousness. 
When the union becomes conscious, it switches from an I-Thou 
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to an I-It. As a result, I see Buber as having a 
recognition of subjectness in a special type of I-It 
relation. That is to say, I meet another as subject with 
subject in a time of conscious mutuality. The use and 
manipulation of the other, which usually characterizes an li­
lt, are absent. The other partner in a genuine dialogue 
must be a subject to me, not an object, yet I must be 
conscious of the occurrence in order to formulate my 
thoughts and language. 
When I think of Buber's concept of images and essences, 
I am drawn to parallel them to Freire's awareness of 
oppression. Peasants or working-class individuals who deny 
their oppression and who conform to fulfill social 
expectations are hiding behind an image. They fail to 
experience their fullest humanity, because they are trying 
to measure up to the expectations of others. Still, if they 
become aware of their oppression, there is no guarantee that 
they will become authentic individuals, exemplifying Buber's 
essence. Instead, they have had years of habits and 
practices of subservience to bring to consciousness or to 
break. The initial acknowledgment is only the beginning to 
the possible fulfillment of their essence. Likewise, it can 
be the start to a transformative consciousness, as they come 
to realize, in contradiction to the powerless they have been 
taught, that they do possess power and rights as human 
beings. Through critical, reflective consciousness, they 
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can utilize the thoughts and processes of the once oppressed 
combined with their own in solidarity. 
In short, Freire gives us a theory focused on one 
person having control over another, a subject-object 
relationship. Sharon Welch continues with his notion of 
oppression, although she makes a different point by her 
admission that she is both oppressed and an oppressor (1985, 
p. 51). She lives within the tension of occupying 
oppositional roles unified within the individual self. 
More than an identification with her as a female, I am 
attracted to Welch's writing because of her attempt at 
praxis, living critically the explanations and beliefs she 
employs in terms of her experiences. She works to merge 
theory and practice, for she has undertaken a struggle for 
liberation. In order to be the person I am and will become, 
I, too, feel that I must strive towards praxis; Welch 
supplies me with a model in which a female educator fights 
to uphold her beliefs through her actions, what I hope and 
try to attain. 
As a woman and a Christian, she is oppressed, for women 
are still striving for equality to men in an environment 
favoring males. Her oppression then is furthered by her 
Christian faith. Its myths and histories denote the 
suppression of women, from Eve's temptation by the serpent, 
to the burning of witches in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, to anti-Semitism, and so on (Welch, 1985, p. 52). 
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A traditional woman, as Welch, is molded on the figure of 
Christ, who quietly suffers and dies for the sake of other 
men and women. She has been taught to be a passive and 
humble caregiver; her life, in the role of mother and 
caregiver, is to be devoted to the welfare of others. The 
potential result becomes an abnegation of the self, in 
addition to the impossible attainment of the role model. 
The sexual deviation from Jesus creates a gap which cannot 
be filled by her victimization (Daly, 1973, p. 77). 
The modes of thought and even the Christian imagery are 
full of patriarchal and dominant metaphors. God, in the 
traditional Christian faith, is assumed to be a white male, 
dressed in flowing robes and with long white hair and beard. 
The pronoun He is used to denote Him or Her, while the 
Christian Savior is again taken to be a male. God first 
creates Adam from dust, and from Adam's rib, He makes Eve. 
Seemingly indicating his dominance over her, Eve is created 
after man and fashioned from a part of him. Moreover, all 
of the prophets, foretelling and spreading the word of God, 
are male. The correlations between Christianity and female 
suppression are easily drawn, so that a woman often 
experiences friction in trying to live up to the universals 
of her faith. 
The Christian faith offers a multitude of such 
universals. Like the metaphors, they tend to apply 
predominantly to white males (Welch, 1985, p. 51). The 
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female gender is not considered in them, with the 
consequence that they are actually selective. They do not 
apply to everyone but are used to establish particular 
traits and aspects as universal norms. Hence, some men have 
pretentiously and arrogantly assumed the power and right to 
speak for others, while the humanization of the others is 
denied and destroyed. 
Welch's vocation as a liberation theologian means that 
she must identify with the oppressed. Her work contains an 
implicit commitment to them and is defined by its 
application of religious beliefs into practice (Welch, 1985, 
p. 26). She is devoted to living out her faith, although 
she admits some skepticism in the commitment. The choice 
for her in a moral one, which she makes regardless of 
tradition and the life of Jesus. Despite the reasons for 
her decision, her identification with the oppressed entails 
that she consciously become an object for exploitation. She 
is caught within the matrix of tradition and practice, so 
that she must reflect critically and avoid being swayed by 
the dominant, oppressive ways of thinking (Welch, 1985, p. 
27). She, as Freire, notes the need for critical 
consciousness in the unification of theory and practice. 
Besides being oppressed, Welch also concedes herself to 
be an oppressor. Because Christianity holds many different 
interpretations and modes of truth, she cannot place 
complete belief in the discourses of liberation theology in 
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comparison to traditional theology. She knows that all 
interpretations are limited by time, and as the society 
changes, so will the theological discourses: 
While it may be valid for others in different contexts 
to ground the truth of their interpretation in the 
authority of the scriptural tradition, in my context 
such a construction of truth seems either naive or 
politically dangerous. For me to identify liberation 
theology as authentically Christian would be to evade 
the temporality of theological discourse. Such 
identification would diminish the complexity of the 
Christian course by establishing a secure home for 
liberation theology within an ascertainable 
transcendent destiny or historical trajectory. (Welch, 
1985, p. 52) 
I interpret Welch's uncertainty about truth to have a very 
personal dimension. After all, who is to say that her way 
of interpreting reality and theology is right or wrong? By 
writing about her position in liberation theology, she is 
also speaking for the oppressed. She, therefore, uses the 
same technique that oppressors have employed for centuries, 
speaking for others rather than letting them speak for 
themselves. 
Like Freire, Welch advocates resistance to oppression 
and struggles for liberation and solidarity. Her claims for 
liberation theology are political, as evinced by her 
identification with the oppressed. She fights for the 
voices of the oppressed, as women and minorities, to 
acknowledge their way of interpreting reality. Such 
knowledge has been suppressed by dominant official knowledge 
and is termed by Foucault (1980) as subjugated. Welch 
struggles for the insurrection of these subjugated 
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knowledges, where she attempts to recognize and challenge 
the oppressive tendencies of theology and society. This 
oppression and resistance linger in the minds of the 
oppressed, in the forms of suffering and hope (Welch, 1985, 
p. 39). They compose dangerous memories that recall 
exploitation, pain, and potential liberation. For example, 
the oppressed hear stories of the victimization of their 
ancestors and experience their own dehumanization. Their 
knowledges have been excluded, and their recognition of 
oppression always contains the chance for protest and for 
change. 
Yet, history is marked by a small number of resistance 
movements (Welch, 1985, p. 39). Domination has prevailed 
and been considered as natural, an ideological belief which 
strengthens the status quo. Changes brought about by the 
oppressed are seemingly neutralized by becoming immersed 
once more into the hegemony. It modifies the threatening 
movements and reshapes them into a new interpretation of 
reality that poses no great risk to the "dominant (Gramsci, 
1971). Resultingly, liberation theology becomes a 
storehouse of dangerous memories for the potential for 
resistance, whether internal and unobservable or external 
and observable (Welch, 1985, p.41). The oppressed must be 
affirmed as human beings; even small instances of resistance 
to the hegemony demonstrate to them their power and dignity. 
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All in all, Welch tells of her faith within the tension 
of dialectics. Her conflict becomes an example of the 
friction many women feel, dealing with their belief system 
in terms of their experiences. She is oppressed, as well as 
an oppressor. She is committed to liberation theology but 
at the same time skeptical about her commitment. She shows 
us that in our relations we can occupy oppositional roles 
simultaneously. We must acknowledge our oppressor qualities 
and work to lessen their dehumanization before we can engage 
in a subject-to-subject union. We must live authenticating 
moments which hold true to our beliefs of love, justice, and 
equality. 
Welch, as Freire, complements Buber's framework of 
relations. Freire adds new factors in terms of oppression 
and domination, with the necessity to change critically the 
consciousness of the oppressed and oppressors. Such 
conditions must be overcome in order for a greater 
likelihood of an I-Thou encounter or of a genuine dialogue. 
Welch shows our capacity for existing within the tension of 
dialectics, so that we may have to come to terms with our 
own conflicts, one of which is the oppressive quality of 
Christianity. Thus, we must struggle with social and 
personal factors as we try to make the world a more humane 
and caring place to live. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRACTICE OF RELATIONSHIPS 
Introduction 
In chapter one I tried to present theories of 
relationships which I find pertinent to understanding human 
experiences. This chapter will deal with four aspects 
which, to some extent, affect relationships in a dialectic 
of theory and experience, namely self-knowledge, class, 
gender, and sub-culture. 
Theory, as an explanation for my experiences, becomes 
dependent upon practice, for there must be some correlation 
between the dialectic in order for theory to be valid or to 
serve as a referent. Otherwise, I am unable to connect 
theory to my experiences and my experiences to theory. I 
seek to combine them, so I can interpret my actions by use 
of theory and then mold or discard certain facets of the 
explanation to fit my experiences more accurately. It is in 
this fitting of theory and practice into praxis where truth 
lies for me. In fact, 11. . . theory and praxis can be 
understood today only in their unity, which means truth is 
not something that we find or by which we are found, but 
something that we make true" (Soelle, 1974, p. 77). As a 
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result, I create truth when I combine theory with my 
experiences to make room for praxis and critical theory. 
Yet, the explanations I use to structure my experiences 
do not all come from the same theory. I select, instead, 
sections of theories to compose a general referent which 
best relates to my experiences. Without this shaping, I 
have difficulty in making the knowledge I gain from theory 
meaningful to me. Even though I can take knowledge into my 
brain for storage, it can remain distant from me. The 
connections, though, allow me to understand and to 
personalize the knowledge on the basis of my life. This is 
a process that I think all of us undertake. 
I must confront, however, the subjective nature of such 
knowledge. It relates to me and my life, although others 
may find similarities to their lives within my 
interpretations. My patchwork effort, where I stitch one 
theory to the next, permits me to search for meaning and 
truth. I acknowledge my humanness when I personalize theory 
and knowledge: 
Subjectivity as the attitude of the individual toward 
knowledge is in this concept identical to 
meaningfulness. Knowledge exists in the learner when 
it is meaningful in his life. When it is not 
meaningful it leads to the dehumanization of its 
possessor. He becomes its tool and instrument and 
takes no responsibility for what he knows. It is the 
subjectivity of knowledge which gives it its validity. 
(Lamm, 1978, p. 134) 
Despite the joining of theory and practice into praxis, 
I am continually struggling to unite the two, as I live 
within their resulting tension. I change with each breath I 
take and every experience I have. Therefore, the balance 
between theory and practice also alters as a consequence of 
my change. Once more, I am walking along the narrow ridge 
of praxis, in a Buberian sense, where one step too far in 
either direction will send me spiralling away from an 
attempted unification. I believe that in the process of 
this tension I must continually strive for its attainment 
but without an awareness of when I do reach, perhaps 
momentarily, the unity. Consciousness of the moment, as 
Buber (1958) indicates, undermines the authenticity of the 
experiences, for I must make the process of searching for 
unity a part of the person I am and the life I lead. The 
seeking is a part of my being, my humanness or Heidegger's 
(1962) Dasein. In other words, my present being, in terms 
of praxis, is not the same as my future being. I cannot 
reach the whole unification in light of my potentiality: 
Everydayness is precisely that Being which is 'between' 
birth and death. And if existence is definite for 
Dasein's Being and if its essence is constituted in 
part by potentiality-for-Being, then, as long as 
Dasein exists, it must in each case, as such a 
potentiality, not vet be something. Any entity whose 
Essence is made up of existence, is essentially opposed 
to the possibility of our getting it in our grasp as an 
entity which is a whole.(Heidegger, 1962, p. 276) 
Hence, my effort to combine theory and practice, at this 
time, is not the same as it will be in the future, because 
time will alter my being and my relations with others. It 
also changes the praxis of relationships, where I depend 
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upon theory, experience, and knowledge to define the other 
person. 
Despite my attempt at praxis, certain factors confront 
me when I, like others, seek to relate to others in a 
subject-to-subject manner. They are facts about me, ones 
over which I have no control. They were present with me at 
birth and continue to be present for me to acknowledge. 
Like each human being, every Dasein, I am thrown into 
existence, with no choice over my parentage, race, gender, 
or place of birth. I am: 
determined by thrownness as a Fact of the entity which 
it is; and, so determined, it has in each case already 
been delivered over to existence, and it constantly so 
remains. ... As something thrown, Dasein has been 
thrown into existence. It exists as an entity which 
has to be as it is and as it can be. (Heidegger, 1962, 
p. 321) 
Part of my identity, these facts often function as barriers 
which can cause friction between the realization of my 
essence and the situation of my relations. Sometimes, they 
can be beneficial and help me to be more sensitive towards 
others, but, one way or another, I must be aware of their 
effect. 
Class, by definition, designates how people relate to 
other people both as individuals and as groups (Bowles & 
Gintis, 1976, p. 67). The groups tend to have similarities, 
like coming from the same general economic or educational 
level, and words used to name the groups—working class, 
lower class, underclass, middle class, and upper class— 
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infiltrate our language. Therefore, the frequency with 
which we speak of class and class distinctions evinces their 
presence. They show that society, in some way, advocates an 
inequality in the distribution of goods and of access to 
knowledge, end products that justify the existence of a 
class system. 
In America, however, one learns that he or she should 
be able to rise from one class level to the next, or even 
higher. Such social mobility is encapsulated in the 
American Dream, where it is assumed that people have some 
control over their class. With hard work and education, 
they should ideologically become upwardly mobile. If they 
stay in the same class, then they supposedly are not working 
hard enough or need more education. A foolproof system 
emerges, with individuals blaming themselves for their 
exclusion from mainstream economic life (Ryan, 1971). After 
all, . . in the United States, if you are not 'somebody,1 
you might, of course be 'nobody,' in the sense that you have 
the strong chance of suffering endless indignities of 
powerlessness and the denial of your very worth by others" 
(Ryan & Sackrey, 1984, p. 1). 
Thus, schools function somewhat as a melting pot of 
class distinctions, offering a channel for possible social 
mobility. All sorts and classes of people are admitted into 
schools and colleges for final finishing touches. Lower-
class members can shed the perceived roughness of their 
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childhood for the smoother finish of the middle-class, while 
middle-class individuals can either be strengthened in their 
current class level or step from one stratification of their 
class to the next higher rung. People from the upper class 
can learn decision-making and analytical skills, in the 
event that they are developing abilities which will help 
them to control capital goods and ownership of productive 
methods within the society (Anyon, 1985, pp. 122-123). They 
are prepared to remain in their class designation, where, in 
addition to promises of upwardness for the lower and middle 
classes, schools work to maintain class differentiation. 
In many ways I have brought the American dream into 
reality. I am from a family who has known the ravages of 
poverty, just as I have lived the deprivations that are a 
part of coming from the working class. Now, I find myself 
studying for a doctorate, with the promise of admission to 
the minority of people who have been granted the degree. I 
am going from near the bottom of the social class structure 
into the professional realm. The realization, however, has 
caused conflicting internal and external cross-currents, to 
the extent that class, for me, has become an obstacle to 
overcome in my social and personal relationships. I no 
longer fit well into either the working class or middle 
class. 
Secondly, my femaleness in a world fashioned from 
"masculine cloth" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 6) automatically leads 
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to the creation of tensions. I must switch from the female 
role of nurturer to the male behaviors of competitiveness 
and individualization, when I go from being a woman in the 
home to an instructor at a university. I am caught within 
the expectations of both roles and must develop competency 
for them. In shifting, I put on social masks appropriate 
for the instances and, in so doing, begin to question where 
my real self, my true essence, lies. I fear, in moving from 
male and female roles, that I will become so adept at role-
playing that I will trap myself into I-Itness. The final 
consequence will be when I will lose touch with myself. 
Thirdly, I was born in Virginia and raised in rural 
North Carolina, so that I was brought up in the Southern 
tradition. I was taught behaviors and norms relevant to the 
region, ranging from the importance of manners and deference 
to the need for submissiveness. I learned the role of a 
Southern woman in the family, modelled passivity in the 
schools, and assimilated t'he inner strength shown by my 
mother and sisters. Overall, I experienced the suppression 
of the Southern woman by social and familial forces, to 
where I must weigh behaviors and speech patterns which come 
naturally to me. Their apparent naturalness indicates the 
concept of hegemony at work, as reflected in how I have 
internalized submissiveness into my behavior and speech 
patterns. 
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All three aspects are combined within me and within 
others raised in a similar manner. They merge to compose my 
identity, and it is hard to separate one from the other. 
Still, I will try to deal with each one separately and to 
recreate the experiences affecting relationships in growing 
up as a Southern woman, daughter of a tobacco farmer, and 
candidate for a doctorate. To help set the mood and feeling 
and to restructure the experiences, I will use a variety of 
literary forms and references—nonfictional academic 
sources, fictional works, and poetry. 
In narrating my experiences critically, I seem to shed 
the barriers which I tend to erect in an I-It world. They 
protect me, so that when I take them down, I become 
vulnerable. I open myself up, especially to the criticisms 
which come when I try to create knowledge rather than solely 
adopting the knowledge of others. This creation of 
knowledge, in combination with that of others, becomes one 
of the higher stages of female development (Belenky, 
Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986). I must, therefore, 
face the world with strength in supporting my world view and 
in coping with my vulnerability. First, though, to provide 
one with some idea of the world from which I come and the 
experiences which I have encountered, I will provide a brief 
autobiographical narration. This information composes some 
of my self-knowledge that I am continually trying to 
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comprehend at deeper levels. I, like other men and women am 
in a state where: 
Man is not free to choose whether or not he wants to 
attain knowledge about himself. He necessarily and 
under all circumstances possesses a degree of such 
knowledge, preconceptions, and standards of self-
interpretation. The paradox is that man is an obscure 
text to himself. He knows that something is meant by 
what he is, by what he does, but he remains perplexed 
when called upon to interpret his own being. (Heschel, 
1965, p. 6) 
My search for self-knowledge ultimately considers what 
I mean to myself as well as what I mean to the people around 
me. Being human allows for the capacity of understanding, 
so I must understand myself in order to understand others. 
One necessitates the other (Heschel, 1965, p. 6). This 
self-comprehension is not inherent. Rather, it must come 
through interpretation of my experiences, interactions, and 
thoughts. While I occupy certain physical space as a 
person, I can also retreat into an inner space. Thus, my 
thoughts fashion my inner reality. What I know and think of 
myself, in the end, determines the person I am and will 
become. 
The world of others, consequently, impinges upon me and 
my consciousness. My self-knowledge is affected by them, 
and I am constantly aware of their presences. My position 
is in relation to their position, for one cannot exist 
without the other for contrast (Heidegger, 1963). I cannot 
exist as a person without another person with whom to 
differentiate myself. I cannot label myself as a woman 
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without knowledge of the characteristics of the female sex. 
I live in a world filled with people, who make it possible 
for my life to have some meaning through my relationships. 
My thoughts of the past, which will form an integral 
part of my dissertation, have been brought into the present. 
They have been altered by time, their clarity dimmed by the 
years. The passing moments have shifted and readjusted 
them, such that with time they become colored in my favor. 
I become the heroine of my memories, just as we all become 
the main character of our lives. The present, eventually 
becoming the past, is always there when we think of days 
gone by. We cannot escape the fallacy of time, for it does 
not allow absolute and factual depictions to exist. Such a 
limitation becomes unavoidable when I recount my 
experiences, but to combat it, I will be as honest as I can 
with my recollections. These thoughts will serve as a 
personalized approach to an evaluation of praxis of 
relationships. 
Hence, to come to terms with factors central to one's 
life, I must focus my thoughts on relationships. They are 
the lens through which I can view my impoverished childhood, 
my womanhood, and my power or lack of it. Relationships 
allow for the alienation I have sometimes felt, when I am 
caught between the potentialities and the realities of my 
connections. All in all, I must confront the aspirations of 
my relationships, what I hope to actualize, and the reality, 
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what I do experience, in order to know more about myself and 
others. Such knowledge is bounded by my class, gender, and 
region where I grew up, aspects which one must consider in 
determining his or her reason for being. 
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Section 1; 
An Autobiographical Sketch 
Introduction 
Individuals are composed of experiences, thoughts, and 
ideas encapsulated within a body of tissue, blood, bone, and 
cell. As a product of heredity worked upon by the 
environment, people are influenced in the interchange of 
genes with the world around them. As persons, they bear 
some linkage to their family, as well as to the region where 
they were raised. Their relationships are influenced by 
such features, helping to fashion their experiences and 
interpretations. Knowledge relating to others begins with 
knowledge of the self, whereas knowledge of others aids in 
self-knowledge. One is dependent upon the other, because 
"existence is coexistence" (Heschel, 1965, p. 45). 
Mv Life 
As a woman from a Southern rural working-class 
background, I have a heritage and strong family 
identification of which I am proud. My father was a tobacco 
sharecropper and spent each year searching f6r money with 
which to pay the bills, put food on the table, and clothe 
all ten of his daughters. He continually tried to conceive 
a son yet was disappointed each time with the birth of 
another girl. My mother married at the age of fourteen, in 
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many ways still a child, although a wedding at that age was 
common in the mountain environment where they grew up. 
Neither of my parents went beyond the elementary grade level 
in their schooling. They were needed more at home to help 
with the farm work, and their parents saw no need for any 
further formal education. Daddy died when I was nine, and 
Mama readjusted from being a submissive housewife to the 
role of controller of the family. Three of my sisters and I 
were still at home and in school at the time of Daddy's 
death. It then became her duty to raise us, keep the family 
together, and function as both mother and father. My 
sisters either left high school in their teens to marry or 
received a diploma and then married. Money was never 
available for them to think in terms of college, so they 
took another avenue to leave home. They relinquished the 
security of my parents' home to enter marriage, which was 
considered by my mother and father to be the suitable role 
for a young woman. 
I was different, though, from my sisters. Marriage 
never appealed to me as the way to establish my independence 
and to break some of the ties with my mother. I thought in 
terms of college and worked hard in school to win 
scholarships. Mama was frightened to think of the expense 
of a university education and tried hard to convince me not 
to seek a higher education. I persisted, however, and 
reaching the legal age of adulthood helped settle the 
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difficulty when I finished high school. In other words, 
there was little my mother could do to prevent me from 
pursuing a college education, so I left home with the 
determination to become a scholar. After receiving my 
bachelor's degree in English, I volunteered for Peace Corps 
service. My assignment was as a teacher of English as a 
foreign language in Senegal, French West Africa. I spent 
three years there and returned to North Carolina to study 
for a masters and doctorate. At home my mother and sisters 
saw me as somewhat unusual, the proverbial black sheep of 
the family; they had learned to accept that I would not be 
satisfied with a husband, a child, a small house, and a job 
as a factory worker, secretary, or teacher's assistant. 
The above sketch outlines the basic facts about me, yet 
they do not really describe the person I am. When I tell 
someone that I grew up in a so-called poor environment, they 
know the statement but cannot begin to fathom my 
experiences, hardships, and joys. When I am asked about my 
work in Africa, I can answer, but frequently my audience 
does not have the experiential base for understanding the 
cultural differences. Now, though, as I write my 
dissertation, I am confronted by the remnants of my family 
background and past, for I must understand them in terms of 
the knowledge I hold, combining the bits and pieces into a 
more cohesive whole. I believe such information and 
procedure are crucial to my dissertation. 
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Next to the youngest in my family, I was born on 
February 26, 1957, in a Chatham, Virginia, public health 
clinic. My father did not have sufficient funds to pay 
hospital fees, so I was delivered at the center. My mother 
stayed there overnight and went home the next morning. 
Although the bill was small for the clinic's work, Daddy 
never paid it. I guess he considered that another girl, 
number nine by ranking, was not worth the money in hard 
financial times. My family lived in Virginia until I was 
three years old. Then we moved to Caswell County in 
Piedmont North Carolina to the small township of Pelham. I 
do not remember much about my childhood in Virginia but can 
recall some memories about my early days in Pelham. 
The first house to which we moved in Pelham was a shack 
on a dirt road. It had an outdoor well and bathroom john, 
my family at that time having never experienced indoor 
plumbing at home. My sisters were responsible for bringing 
in well water for cooking, cleaning, and bathing. We did 
not stay long -at this house before Daddy had met a landowner 
who needed his help in tobacco, and we packed up and moved 
to another house in Pelham. It was much larger than the 
first but, once again, did not have indoor plumbing. It did 
boast, however, a long curving staircase, the railing of 
which was excellent for sliding down when Mama was not 
looking. I also attribute to this second house my first 
encounter with serious illness. My sister Kathy had brought 
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measles home from school, and I caught them from her. My 
nose started to bleed and, despite repeated attempts, would 
not stop. Mama finally resorted to mountain home remedies 
and hung a nail on a thread around my neck. For some 
reason, the blood stopped, marking the start of my recovery 
to health. 
Following a pattern, we did not live in the second 
house over a year before we moved to a third house in 
Pelham, located next to the landowner. This house is the 
one that I considered home, because my family lived in it 
for about fifteen years. It had the amenities of plumbing, 
not to mention an inside bathroom, although it was so cold 
in the winter that I could see my breath when I got out of 
bed in the mornings. It was from this house that I started 
Pelham Elementary School and eventually attended Dillard 
Junior High, Bartlett Yancey Senior High, and the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
In addition, I can remember scenes from my childhood, 
as sitting by the wood heater, rocking, and looking at 
pictures in magazines and my older sisters' schoolbooks. 
Daddy would lie on the other side of the heater in his 
lounge chair. He had suffered through the measles in his 
thirties and with his ability to walk impaired, required a 
cane to travel from one point to the next. He still farmed, 
though, or had us work for the landowner for hourly wages. 
Mama seemed always to be occupied. Daddy expected three 
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cooked meals each day, usually butter biscuits and sliced 
tomatoes for breakfast, pinto beans and cornbread for lunch 
and dinner, and fried chicken and fruit cobbler on Sundays 
at mealtimes. He sat at the head of the table and my mother 
at the other end, while my sisters and I sat at the sides. 
Conversation was limited at meal time, for Daddy said that 
we were at the table to eat and not to socialize. His word 
was the law in our family. Mama stood up to him when she 
thought he was wrong, but he always had the final say. We 
were taught to show respect for our elders, particularly our 
parents, and any signs of disrespect were punished. 
Daddy also had his odd beliefs, his so-called "curious 
ways." We did not own a television set until at about the 
time when I started elementary school in 1963. No one in 
the family was to turn on the television except Daddy. Of 
course, being able to watch moving scenes and listen to 
sounds coming from the same screen were too much of a 
temptation for us during his absence. When he went to the 
store for groceries, my sisters or I would turn on the 
television set. One of us, usually the youngest, would be 
stationed at the window to watch for his return. When we 
saw his truck coming up the driveway, we quickly turned off 
the set and pretended to be doing some other activity. 
Daddy knew us too well, though. He always came into the 
house, went to the television, and felt whether or not the 
top of it was warm. If it was, then he fussed at us for our 
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disobedience, but besides a few muttered statements about 
the cost of the electricity bill, he never punished our 
waywardness. Seemingly, he expected the set to be warm, as 
though he, as well as us, was playing a game of rules and 
counter-strategies. 
In the summer Mama took me to the barn where I had to 
pick up tobacco leaves dropped in the process of tying them 
to a stick for placement in the barn for curing. As I grew 
older, it was my responsibility to work in the fields and at 
the barn, just as my sisters and she did. We were not to 
complain about working eight, even up to fifteen hours daily 
in tobacco, for we were all part of a family and had to put 
our wages together for support. As long as Daddy was alive 
we gave our money to him. Mama took the place of banker 
when he died. We were told that the money we made went to 
buy supplies for school. At least, that was the case in 
Mama's control of the money, although not in Daddy's. He 
liked to drink alcohol, especially brews made illegally in 
the hills and called white lightning. At some time he had 
even engaged in running a still to make the potent liquor. 
Frequently, he took the cured tobacco crop to market and 
bought whiskey with the profits. His indulgences meant that 
we would have an even harder winter coming and with slimmer 
funds to support us. 
Thus, my recollections about my childhood revolve 
around hard work and obedience. We were never to question 
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our parents, especially my father, about what they told us 
to do. Instead, we were to finish the assigned project. 
For instance, he told my sisters to sucker the tobacco field 
one Saturday while he went to town. Suckers are growths 
which come between the tobacco leaf and the stalk. They 
must be pulled off and an oil, which retards their growth, 
placed at the union of the leaf to the stalk. Daddy mixed 
sufficient oil for several acres of tobacco and left after 
giving the instructions to my sisters. They, however, had 
dates that night and wanted to spend the time preparing for 
their boyfriends. They took the sucker oil into the field 
and poured it out. With the oil no longer present, they 
came home and got ready for their dates. When Daddy arrived 
home, he went to the field to check on the work he had given 
them to do. Immediately he saw that they had, in fact, done 
little of the assigned task. He prepared more oil, returned 
to the house, and made my sisters go back to the field. 
They worked in the dark suckering the plants. That Saturday 
no one in our family dated, but the job Daddy had given them 
to do was finished. I was too young at the time to be a 
participant in the folly. My sisters recounted the tale to 
me, and I knew from the way I was raised that work was 
always to come before pleasure and that one's freedom could 
be controlled by an authority figure. 
When I started school, I went with Mama to Pelham 
Elementary for an introductory visitation. Daddy sat in the 
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truck and waited for the meeting to finish. Mama could not 
drive, so she was dependent upon him for all of her 
transportation any considerable distance from home. I was 
scared and clung to Mama, but my first-grade teacher gave me 
a picture to color. Then I was treated to an ice cream bar. 
In the midst of the activity, I forgot about the strangeness 
of going to school for the first time. The ice cream helped 
me to decide that I liked going to school, as my eight older 
sisters did or had done. I wanted to be able to read a 
book, not just look at the pictures. I wanted to enter the 
realms where knowledge supposedly resided and learn the 
skills necessary to make it accessible to me. 
The bus picked me up each morning five days a week, as 
I made the trip to school in order to learn certain forms of 
knowledge unaccessible at home. I liked school in the 
beginning but soon discovered that boredom was a large 
component to the school experience (Jackson, 1987, p. 109). 
I usually finished my assignments early, so what was I going 
to do next? I turned to books, a reinforcement of my 
earlier habit of retreating from the world around me into 
the imaginary world of words. I could forget the 
degradation of wearing homemade and hand-me-down clothing in 
the pages, as books provided me knowledge about another 
reality. In them, I could erase for the time the chores I 
had to do when I returned home—wood to split and stack 
neatly in the wood box, coal to be shoveled into buckets and 
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brought inside, kindling to be cut and placed behind the 
heaters, chickens and pigs to be fed and watered, floors 
swept and mopped, dishes washed and dried, homework 
completed, and lessons studied. School and books could take 
me away from the world of poverty in which I lived. Through 
reading I could become rich, have beautiful new clothes, and 
a white house to live in like the one Dick and Jane had in 
the first-grade reader. I could be more like members of 
other families, who bought most of their food from grocery 
stores rather than growing it in the garden. The long bus 
ride home, though, always brought me back to earth. The 
reality of poverty awakened me; work remained to be done. 
The summers, however, brought a change of pace. 
Classes were dismissed, and my time became occupied with 
work in tobacco rather than hours spent in school. On the 
few days when I was not required to help in the fields or at 
the barn, I could play once more in the make-believe world. 
My sisters Kathy and Patsy and I had a play house at the end 
of the yard under the pecan tree. There we could fix mud 
pies and cakes, decorated with stray nut shells or 
pokeberries from nearby bushes. Our tin cans were stacked 
on a shelf we had constructed, and we could take turns on 
which one of us would be the father, mother, or child. All 
of us preferred to be either the father or mother because we 
could then prop ourselves by the pecan tree, in an imitation 
of our father, or make mud biscuits for dinner, in a 
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dramatization of our mother. No one particularly wanted to 
be the child, for we would then have to make strange 
unintelligible sounds and pretend to cry. Acting as a baby 
meant that we were under the domination of those older than 
us. No one wanted that authoritative hierarchy in our play 
life as in our work life, but we replicated our family 
structure as it was the only type we knew experientially. 
After the field work had been finished for the day, 
Mama would call us to help her peel peaches, break up green 
beans, or shell butter beans on the large cement porch. 
Sunday afternoons were particularly suitable for such 
activities, as Mama tried to can enough vegetables and 
preserves for the winter months. With enamel pans 
positioned on our laps and newspapers spread on the porch to 
catch the discarded ends, two of us would sit in the porch 
swing. The back and forth motions, as we pushed the swing 
gently with our feet, lulled us into the pace of snapping or 
shelling bean after bean. The rest of womenfolk present 
would gather together in a circle with the swing. 
Sometimes, Daddy or my brothers-in-law would help with the 
tasks, but usually they congregated inside the house. They 
talked about hunting, cars, and the like, while Mama and my 
married sisters filled us in on who had been sick, recipes 
they had tried, or activities of my nieces and nephews. If 
Mama did not need me to help with the vegetables,, she would 
place me at the kitchen sink to wash out Mason jars in 
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preparation for sterilizing them. I would squeeze my hands, 
slippery with soap, into the jar mouths and swish around the 
dishcloth. My fear was to get my hand stuck in a jar, but 
thankfully, that never happened. Still the place and duties 
of the female were impressed upon me. We were separate from 
men and should devote our lives to caring for them. 
The years passed, as certain values and ways of life 
were impressed upon me. One main idea was that although men 
were supposed to be the stronger and more dominant, women 
were underneath it all the more courageous. Daddy just 
believed that the family control laid in his hands, yet Mama 
was the one who held the family together. She always 
scraped together enough food to eat and money to pay the 
rent. Ten times she suffered the pains of childbirth, many 
of which were without anesthetic. The midwife, Daddy's 
sister, told her to grit her teeth and bear the agony. One 
or two days after the childbirth, Mama was either back in 
the fields or working in the house, because there always 
remained work to be done to ensure the next meal on the 
table. She, thus, did not have time to recuperate from her 
pregnancies. When Daddy died, Mama, unaccustomed to even 
buying groceries, squared her shoulders in determination to 
act as both mother and father to those of us still living at 
home. She managed to take over the reins of family. 
Daddy, under the illusion of male superiority, never 
appeared to learn the secret of a woman's strength. As 
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females, we were to be seemingly indomitable figures like my 
mother and the women before her—unshakable upholders of the 
family honor and conduct—who appeared passive to the 
present males. 
Of course, Mama had learned her behavior and mores from 
her mother and her mother's mother. We were to transmit the 
family tradition to our children, for: 
A mother does not merely pass on the messages of her 
culture; she also passes on her responses to the 
messages she received from her mother. Thus, every 
transaction between mother and daughter is in a sense 
of transaction among three generations. (Hammer, 1975, 
p. xiv) 
She taught us that we were the ones to maintain family 
relationships as she and her ancestors had done. We were to 
carry on the female behavior of caring for others as one 
piece in a fitted puzzle of historical events. History, 
after all, was all around us, and I grew up hearing stories 
about my great-great uncles who had fought and died for the 
Confederacy in the Civil War. Even our house had been built 
before the Civil War. The old folk of the town described it 
as a gambling establishment for gentlemen to come and wager 
their fortunes. The room upstairs, with its split plank 
floor, rock chimney, and tiny windows, seemed to house their 
ghosts. I could imagine their presences, Rhett Butlers 
arrogantly throwing down high stakes of honor. The house 
across the railroad tracks from us sported marble columns. 
Behind it stood the falling shanties which had once served 
as slave quarters. Mama and Daddy were proud of their 
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Southern origins, for my ancestors had lived in the 
foothills of North Carolina and Virginia for generations. 
Everywhere around me were reminiscences of the past. I was 
born into a tradition which could not forget its roots and 
its function as a mainstay for relationships. 
Relationships with my mother and father, as a result, 
have centered around authority and obedience., I was always 
to listen to their word and follow their advice, as they had 
done for their parents. They expected me to conform to 
their wishes, allowing for little resistance to their power 
and control. Needless to say, I underwent conflicting 
pressures. First, there were tensions coming from my 
parents in contrast to my desires for freedom, especially 
during my adolescent years. As most teenagers, I wanted to 
be in command of my destiny, to assert my identity rather 
than being an appendage of my parents. They expected 
certain behaviors and roles from me as their daughter, while 
I both wanted to acquiesce to their requests as well as 
assert my will to be a separate individual. With pressures 
as these present, it can become difficult to show the caring 
and love one feels for others. Instead, he or she is being 
affected by currents over which he or she has little 
control, to comply with others or to assume responsibility 
for his or her own being, to play the dutiful daughter for 
which one is conditioned or to develop himself or herself 
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regardless of the role. One is caught within the moment of 
confusion and questions his or her identity: 
Which do we kill, which image in the mirror, the 
mother, ourself, our daughter? ? ? ? ? Am I my mother, 
or my daughter? (Sexton, 1977, p. 40) 
In the midst of internal struggle, one doubts himself or 
herself, but he or she can also gain strength from the 
confusion to continue in his or her self-development. He or 
she must, in other words, break away from certain 
relationships in order to return to them with different 
perceptions (Heschel, 1965). 
An example of the friction between self and other lies 
in the opposition of my mother to my decision to attend 
college. To reiterate, she was worried about the expense of 
an undergraduate degree, in part because she believed that 
it was her duty to help pay the expense. I assured her that 
I could win sufficient scholarships for funding, and it was 
my choice to seek higher learning. She still, however, 
seemed to think that a good mother would bear the costs of a 
daughter's education. She could not spare the funds, 
though, and was left in the friction of her beliefs and 
reality. As a result, she seemed to perceive herself as a 
failure and to underevaluate herself as a mother, despite my 
assurances to the contrary. 
I have, likewise, tried to understand my mother's 
reluctance by looking at other possibilities. First, my 
journey to Chapel Hill equaled my exit from home and her 
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control and protection over me. As she had little 
experience of universities, my sisters going no more than 
high school and her no further than the seventh grade, she 
possessed no sound basis for an interpretation of my college 
days. Experientially, I was going away from her. She may 
also have been bothered by my wish to improve myself. Of 
course, she wanted me to have a better and more successful 
life than she had had yet, in a contradictory fashion, 
worried that if I gained a college degree, would it mean 
that she was beneath me? After all, we had been subservient 
for years to the landlord, and Mama knew, in more ways than 
I, of the presence of a class structure. 
From my perspective, there was an attractive aura about 
learning, for universities guaranteed training in how to 
acquire knowledge which was not available at home. They 
supplied entrances into middle-class professions, with the 
attached information on how to act socially. Teachers at 
the schools I had attended filled my head with stories about 
a college degree meaning economic mobility, and I came to 
see college as essential for the enrichment of my life and 
mind. I wanted access to knowledge, not only for leaving 
home but for defining the type of person I wanted to become. 
I pictured myself as a scholar, who could take the best of 
both worlds, the strength, honesty, and pride exemplified in 
my family with the professionalism and financial stability 
of academia. 
76 
Both my mother and I were experiencing to an extent the 
force of culturally patterned behaviors of a mother and 
daughter. We were taking the predetermined demands of our 
positions and were evaluating our relationship on the basis 
of a mythology. I believe that she wanted the best for me 
in her estimation of what constituted the best, but I saw 
the best in a very different light. We were portraying a 
typical and even stereotypical paradigm of mother-daughter 
relationships in our conflict: 
Because the prevailing social mythology of the American 
culture leads children to expect that they have a right 
to an exclusive mothering person who will offer 
unconditional love, meet all of their needs, and play 
certain stereotypical roles, anxiety and resentment are 
experienced when that expectation is not fulfilled. 
Mothers, too, are victimized by the mythology, for they 
are measured against an ideal fantasy that frustrates 
and confounds ordinary women. The overwhelming effect 
of the mythology is the perpetuation of extraordinary 
expectations on the part of children and inordinate 
guilt in their mothers. On the whole, American mothers 
are not confident in their mothering role and—faithful 
little mirrors that they are—children often confirm 
their feelings of inadequacy. (Kolbenschlag, 1981, p. 
36) 
The years at Chapel Hill do not stand out in my 
memories except for feelings of alienation. This was my 
first extended time away from home, and I went from a small 
rural high school to a large, city-based university. As 
such, I switched from being well-known in one setting to 
being an identification number in the other. It was very 
unsettling never to be called or known by name in classes 
composed of several hundreds of students. Then, I was 
required to take courses in which I had little interest and 
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to memorize knowledge that had almost no connection to my 
experiences. Boredom resulted, while one of my primary 
goals became to meet the predetermined course requirements 
rather than actively to participate in learning. I made no 
close friendships during those years, because I often had 
the feeling that I was in the wrong place. After all, I, 
who was from an impoverished family, had been allowed 
entrance into the middle-class context of a university. 
Subtle hints were present that the university world would 
better suit someone from another class. For example, my 
Southern twang was drained from my voice, and my grammar 
corrected. I learned, unfortunately, to be somewhat 
scornful of people who were not seeking academic knowledge, 
while I adopted the purported behavior of a scholar, one who 
walks around with a distracted look, books, glasses, and a 
disarrayed manner of dress. Such behaviors were adopted for 
the purpose of fitting into the academic setting. I 
learned, consequently, from undergraduate classes, to put on 
airs, to pretend to be someone or something which I was not. 
Although I ultimately acquired a credential from Chapel Hill 
that permitted me access to higher degrees, I also became 
distant from myself. One of the basic questions for me 
became the person I was and the reason for my existence. My 
search encompassed both the self and larger issues. Little 
did I realize that this is a procedure which many encounter: 
Imbedded in the mind is a certainty that the state of 
existence and the state of meaning stand in a relation 
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to each other, that life is assessable in terms of 
meaning. The will to meaning and the certainty of the 
legitimacy of our striving to ascertain it are as 
intrinsically human as the will to live and the 
certainty of being alive. (Heschel, 1965, p. 54) 
Driven by a search for my identity, questions of 
meaning, and the nurturing role of a woman, I volunteered 
for Peace Corps service in Senegal, French West Africa. I 
wanted to see what it was like to live without modern 
amenities of washing machines, televisions, and the like; to 
bake my own bread from yeast and flour; and to sew my 
clothing by hand. In the same fashion, I thought I could 
help others with the knowledge I had accumulated and share 
my abilities with others. As a result, I went from an 
English-speaking, predominantly white country to a French-
speaking, largely black nation. When the airplane left 
Greensboro Airport en route to Philadelphia, I took my first 
plane trip away from the boundaries of the South. I thought 
I was leaving behind me factors which had influenced and 
molded me into the person I was, a woman unsure of herself 
and her place in the world. Instead, I took them along with 
me, like worn shoes which cannot be discarded. The plane's 
arrival in Dakar, Senegal, introduced me to life in a 
country of different customs, languages, and peoples. I saw 
poverty of a worse scale than in my family. I witnessed a 
determination for knowledge exceeding my own. People were 
struggling for survival, even scrounging in the garbage 
dumps and cans for food to eat. Teaching class after class 
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of malnourished children pushed me into a confrontation 
which I had avoided, that a large percentage of the world's 
people lived in poverty. 
Monday through Saturday I taught classes ranging in 
numbers from fifty-five to sixty students each. I would 
have an average of only five females to every class, for the 
Senegalese belief held that the place for the woman was in 
the hut taking care of the husband or producing children to 
honor their father. In many ways, my mother's life 
paralleled that of the Senegalese woman. Men were dominant, 
despite the fact that native women had fewer rights than 
their American counterparts. A male was entitled to have up 
to four wives; she, only one husband unless in the case of 
death, whereupon it was the duty of a relative of the 
husband to marry her. In the rare divorce, the husband 
usually was granted custody of the children and rights to 
all property. She was typically illiterate, for an 
education would give her a greater chance at employment away 
from the home. She was largely powerless, a servant to her 
husband and children. 
Once more, I was shown my place in subtle ways. 
Although I was white and educated, I was also female and 
required indoctrination into the superiority of the 
Senegalese male. Upon arriving in Ziguinchor where I was to 
teach at the College de 1'Enseignement Secondaire, I learned 
that the principal had requested a meeting with me. When I 
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went to the school, the secretary informed me that the 
meeting had been rescheduled for the next day. This same 
pattern of having a meeting and then changing the time 
continued for five days. Each time I walked two miles from 
my house to the school in sand and along dirt roads for a 
session which did not occur. At last, when I did see the 
principal, he laughed at his behavior, confessing that he 
had been testing my dedication to teaching. He, 
furthermore, demonstrated to me that I was not that 
important in his scheme of things. 
My time in Senegal was one of continual readjustment, 
extending from having few amenities in my house to 
instructing in a school with no electricity and ceiling. 
One day my alienation was emphasized when an owl flew into 
my classroom. The students reacted violently, getting up 
from their desks and rushing towards the door. My attempts 
to maintain order were of little use, for the owl, 
frightened by the clamor, flew into the next classroom. The 
students there started throwing stones at the bird that was 
going from room to room to escape danger. Needless to say, 
no one had class that morning, due to the simple disruption 
of an owl. When I asked about the confusion, it was 
explained to me that for the Diola and Mandinque tribes, the 
owl entering into an enclosed space represented death. 
Someone, according to their beliefs, would die unless the 
owl was killed first. Hence, the students were reacting to 
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a very real fear in an effort to protect themselves and 
others from evil spirits. 
Similarly, several times each year the air would be 
filled with the beats and clatter of metal hitting metal. 
Women, men, and children at dusk would come onto the 
streets, clanging pots, pan, and tin cans together. The 
evil spirit on these nights was said to be flying from house 
to house. The noise was to keep it from landing, because if 
it rested on any one house, then superstition held that 
someone in the dwelling would die. Such beliefs were an 
essential part of their lives and marked my time in another 
culture. They, furthermore, illustrated lack of connection 
between the Senegalese and me, except for our commonality as 
fellow human beings who were responsible for one another. 
I still enjoyed some close relationships in Senegal 
regardless of my alienation. I guess that the differences 
around me were so great that I was forced to connect to 
others for my survival. The principal became a friend, 
although I was always aware of the roles of authority and 
submissiveness in his presence. Similarly, my friendships 
included other Americans who were as estranged as I. We 
were perhaps unified by our alienation, so that, in a 
circular pattern of reasoning, alienation acted as a basis 
for our relationship. All in all, the knowledge I acquired 
about another people heightened my awareness of the other 
individual and our inescapable interdependence. 
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Part of my decision to be a volunteer rested in my 
desire to care for others outside of the family unit. I had 
been raised by my mother to internalize the role of wife in 
caring for her husband and children. I, like other women, 
had even come to evaluate myself through my ability to care, 
because: 
. . . women not only define themselves in a context of 
human relationships but also judge themselves in terms 
of their ability to care. . . a responsibility to 
discern and alleviate the 'real and recognizable 
trouble' of this world. (Gilligan, 1982, pp. 17, 100) 
The alienation, though, that I had experienced at Chapel 
Hill led me to question the importance of relating to other 
people, and in an effort to discover some answers I set off 
for Africa. I wanted to actualize the sense of caring, to 
take my behavior from my beliefs into action by teaching in 
a Third-World school. I had to find out the importance 
caring had to my life, and in Senegal I believed that my 
help was needed. The aspect of being needed and having 
one's caring accepted reaffirmed my existence. In other 
words, I discovered that one's reason for living is joined 
to other people. I was born to care for others in some form 
or fashion, in a manner of caring for others in order to 
care for the self and of caring for the self in order to 
care for others. This perspective: 
focuses on the dynamics of relationships and dissipates 
the tension between selfishness and responsibility 
through a new understanding of the interconnection 
between other and self. Care becomes the self-chosen 
principle of a judgment that remains psychological in 
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its condemnation of exploitation and hurt. (Gilligan, 
1982, p. 74) 
After three years in Africa, from 1981 to 1984, I 
returned to North Carolina, rushed through my masters, and 
started on my doctorate. Once again, as I look at the white 
sheets in front of me waiting for the mark of my pen, I face 
certain elements which have appeared and reappeared in my 
life, namely the forces of rural poverty, Southernness, and 
womanhood. My time in Africa showed me that I cannot put 
them to rest. They compose a part of me, and unless I deny 
my identity, they will be with me to confront until I die. 
I bump against them continually, especially since I am now a 
student in middle-class academia. I try to reshape myself 
to fit into the present environment, yet the rough edges and 
protrusions of my background create a friction between my 
values and those of the university world around me (Ryan & 
Sackrey, 1984). I am caught, as one representing many other 
individuals, within the consequential tensions surrounding 
relationships. 
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Section 2; 
The Shadows of Class on Relationships: 
The American Dream. Higher 
Education, and Oppression 
Introduction 
The American dream, part of the ideology supporting 
inequalities, centers on social mobility. Most Americans 
are brought up to believe that they are free to leave the 
social or educational class of their parents and rise to 
other levels. They believe that they are not defined mainly 
on the basis of their parents' income or educational 
standing but, rather, are to be judged for the people they 
are. Education becomes the social institution for personal 
development and equal opportunity, a pacifier for women, 
minorities, and the like living in the grips of inequality, 
as passage through certain educational programs supposedly 
permits one entrance into an occupational ladder with 
expectations of economic success. 
Nevertheless, many students of the latter half of the 
twentieth century have seen where the American dream has 
begun to fade (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). The myth does not 
fully apply to our society. Although there have been 
dramatic increases in college enrollment, the possibilities 
of an upwardly mobile economic class are very limited. Most 
mobility happens within the stratifications of the same 
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class, as going from a skilled blue collar laborer to a blue 
collar supervisor. The progression from working class to 
upper class rarely occurs, and it is seldom that someone 
from the owning class ends up in the working class (Ryan & 
Sackrey, 1984, p. 2). Similarly, despite stress on higher 
education, with prescribed course requirements, the Horatio 
Alger myth of upward mobility, with one rising to riches 
through luck, no longer readily applies (Spring, 1980, p. 
64). Often, professions help to set the requirements for 
colleges, so that some control is placed on the number of 
individuals who can eventually meet the criteria for 
admission into middle-class occupations. As a result, 
mobility which does occur is usually very small, for it is 
hard to leave behind the socio-economic classification of 
one's parents. 
Moreover, according to some theorists, education has 
never been a major factor in economic equality, regardless 
of the American dream mythology (Bowles & Gintis, 1976, p. 
8). The degree to which income or job status has changed 
for the sons and daughters is slight in comparison to their 
family backgrounds. Likewise, educational attainment has 
also remained correlated to family background, and: 
. . . the evidence indicates that, despite the vast 
increase in college enrollments, the probability of a 
high school graduate attending college is just as 
dependent on parental socio-economic status as it was 
thirty years ago. (Bowles & Gintis, 1976, p.. 8) 
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Understanding that there is only a small likelihood for one 
from the working class to attend college, he or she can be 
an exception to the rule, as some avenues are present for a 
relatively meager percentage of people to experience 
mobility. Otherwise, the hegemonic declaration of economic 
progression would not work so effectively in our thoughts 
and dreams. If no one were to rise from one class level to 
the next, regardless of the smallness of the increase, then 
the American dream would lose some of its power. Yet, 
because some people do evince mobility, others cannot help 
but believe that they too have that potential. For 
instance, scholarships and loans frequently are based on 
economic need, as well as academic achievement. High 
performance on tests, like the Scholastic Aptitude Test, 
Graduate Requirement Examination, and Miller's Analogy Test, 
provides added chances for acquiring funds, although they 
also function to weed out a number of applicants from 
entrance into formal education. Hence, with the opportunity 
present for some students from the working class to enter 
colleges and universities, the knowledge of the academic 
milieu becomes available to them to explore and to acquire. 
A university's academic world, however, tends to be 
middle-class. It relates to the dominant class in society 
and separates people from the industrialized blue collar 
jobs to place them in an ivory-tower pursuit of knowledge. 
Libraries are full of books on nearly every subject, 
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enabling faculty and students to read, discuss, or explore 
almost any subject imaginable. Freedom is offered for the 
acquisition of knowledge, and the more in-depth one goes in 
his or her studies, then the more knowledge he or she 
supposedly has access for mastery. With the credentials of 
the acquisition of such knowledge, he or she can supposedly 
become upwardly bound, to move from the non-professional to 
professional status in an attempted actualization of the 
American dream. 
Still, faculty and students who come from the working 
class and gain admission to higher education often 
experience tensions. The hodge-podge nature of colleges and 
universities, with some mixture of class levels and a 
variety of fields of study, enables individuals from the 
working class who attend a university or college to acquire 
a middle-class finish. Driven by wishes for economic 
success, they are not totally satisfied with the class level 
of their births but, instead, want to gain touches of the 
middle-class world. That is to say, they want to be 
acculturated somewhat into a different class and leave 
behind them many of the facets associated with their 
original class, as poverty and factory labor. Such a 
transformation tends not to take place over night but 
requires time, a certain knowledge, and a critical awareness 
of the type of person one wants to become. 
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Some faculty who have risen from the working class see 
themselves as unfortunate supporters of the hegemonic 
structure which justifies oppression, while others are 
critical of it. They teach students from all classes, some 
of whom will be the bosses and supervisors of other workers. 
Because universities and colleges, like schools, relate to 
the norms of society (Bowles & Gintis, 1976), faculty 
members cannot escape the Catch-22 situation where they must 
perpetuate a system of privileges or lose their jobs. They 
even enjoy status and privileges over their students because 
faculty members have greater knowledge and more degrees. 
Still, they once were like some of their students and now 
are both the oppressed of the social system and the 
oppressors in replicating a potentially unjust society. 
They live in a state of tension where: 
. . . the academic from a working class background is 
the trainer and certifier of the sons and daughters of 
the dominant class who will, for the most part, replace 
their parents in stations of command. ... If one 
teaches in non-elite public or private higher 
education, one participates in a "weeding-out" process 
which sifts the relatively few "worthy" members for the 
rewards that come with social promotion, and in so 
doing perpetuates not only the structure of capitalist 
class relations, but also the powerful myth of fair and 
equal opportunity for social mobility upward. All this 
is weaponry of the dominant class to sustain the 
legitimacy of their privileges, because the actual 
frequency of significant social mobility is quite 
different from what the myth would have us believe. 
(Ryan & Sackrey, 1984, p. 114) 
As oppressors, faculty members are subjects with power to 
control others, while as oppressed, they become objects with 
a lesser degree of power. Such tension can be reflected in 
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their relationships, for they may be uncertain about the 
self in regard to others and about others in relation to the 
self: 
The individual sees himself from the point of view of 
the group. The individual sees himself from the point 
of view of other individuals and they from the point of 
view of himself. (Mead, 1982, p. 95) 
Students from the working class who find themselves in 
the academic world frequently undergo class tensions, too. 
Their conflict is often internal, for in obtaining a college 
finish they must, at least to some degree, reflect upon some 
aspects of their original class. They are pressured to 
confront ways of their parents and adopt supposedly more 
appropriate mores (Ryan & Sackrey, 1984). It is in the 
classification of not-as-good-as where much friction lies, 
for many students have been taught to respect their parents. 
Part of this respect is in obedience to them, yet students 
learn in academia to put on behaviors which tend to separate 
them from their community of origin, as in the case of the 
language they use. Frequently, being a student from the 
working class is like pulling and being pulled. The 
behaviors learned at birth and in college can be 
contradictory ones, with the result that the potential rise 
in class entails a split in character. At home working-
class students must act one way, while at college they must 
act another way. For instance, in the classroom I am 
conscious of my use of correct grammar and vocabulary, for I 
am in an environment where I will be judged by students and 
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colleagues on such matters. When I visit my mother, 
however, I avoid terms I know she has not had exposure to 
and even catch myself making obvious grammatical errors. In 
this manner, I employ speech patterns to fit the situation, 
with the hope that the listeners will be better able to 
understand what I am saying. I also do not want to "put on 
airs" at home by flaunting the knowledge I have had access 
to but which my family has not. I want them to be 
comfortable around me and for me to be at ease around them. 
Just as I am pursuing a doctorate at the University of 
North Carolina at Greensboro, my masters and undergraduate 
degree were granted by state universities. My poverty 
determined to an extent which ones I would attend, and my 
family's social class closed the doors on admission to some 
colleges. Therefore, my education was not at the more 
prestigious Ivy League institutions, with the result that 
the reputation of the universities where one receives his or 
her degrees will determine somewhat how administrators view 
his or her applications for teaching positions: 
. . . the late arrivers on the professional scene, for 
the most part, end up somewhere towards the bottom of 
the prestige scale of the profession, if for no other 
reason, they are affiliated with second rank 
institutions. Assuming working class academics are to 
some degree assimilated into the cultural ethos of the 
professional, they may subjectively experience their 
social reality as back down on the bottom of the heap, 
as mass, indistinguishable and undistinguished. (Ryan & 
Sackrey, 1984, p. 77) 
Hence, being from the working class affects somewhat the 
employment one acquires and relates to his or her sense of 
91 
self-worth. It can also function as a restraint in his or 
her attainment of certain positions, his or her acceptance 
in a particular setting, and his or her feeling of social 
alienation. 
Analysis 
Class, as evinced in the American dream, entails a 
hierarchy of placing one person above the other in a 
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designation of class levels. Upper class students are 
prepared for executive and ownership roles, while working 
class students become employees of the upper class. One 
controls the other to a degree, just as one who comes from a 
working class background is socially perceived to be more 
disadvantaged than one born into a middle class environment. 
Consequently, he or she bears the taint of "not as good as" 
and can be perceived by others as inferior or powerless. 
For clarification, we can take an example of a bank 
president and a homeless individual. The economic power and 
control a bank president wields is obviously much greater 
than that of a street person. Because the president has 
access to more power, an inequality of subject to object 
results, a condition that is antithetical to Freire's 
dialogue: 
Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the 
world in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue 
cannot occur between those who want to name the world 
and those who do not wish this naming—between those 
who deny other men the right to speak their word and 
those whose right to speak has been denied them. 
(Freire, 1986, p. 76) 
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By implication, the bank president's economic control 
provides the power to name reality, whereas the homeless 
individual will probably have the world named for him or 
her. One can conclude that class levels, thus, can lead to 
and even support an inequality of power—dominant and 
repressed, oppressor and oppressed—in one's relationships. 
Class relates to exemplars of subject and object encounters 
in an I-It world, where one person is using or manipulating 
the other. 
I need to explain that I am not referring to Buber's I-
Thou relationship here, because this union occurs by grace 
and without consciousness. In Buber's view, class does not 
enter into an I-Thou and is not a boundary for attaining the 
relationship. However, from my perspective, class can be a 
factor in Buber's dialogical state, which is somewhat 
different from his I-Thou union. Rather than partners 
encountering one another as subjects in dialogue, class 
seems to entail the perception of others as objects for 
manipulation and use. 
Additionally, the oppressed often identify with the 
oppressors through hegemony, as the oppressed come to 
acknowledge the behaviors and morals of the oppressor 
(Freire, 1986). The modelling has the potential to remove 
people from their true selves or essences, for the behaviors 
they copy will not be truly their own. That is to say, the 
behaviors of one may be artificial when imitated by another 
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and act to distance him or her from authenticity. After 
all, only subject-to-subject encounters have the potential 
of authenticity (Buber, 1970); otherwise, we would be forced 
to admit that perceiving people as objects permits them 
equal status, dignity, and power as a perception of them as 
subjects. 
The American dream, too, can function as a yardstick to 
determine the self-worth of others, where the mythology 
serves as a measure of economic success. Confusion, though, 
surrounds the American dream, for when one experiences 
economic mobility, he or she has demonstrated that the dream 
works, however limited the degree. At the same time, the 
smallness of the increase or the eventuality of no fluidity 
indicates that the myth is not true, that it is, as its name 
verifies, only a dream. One feels the pressures of 
believing and yet not believing in the mythology and its 
relevance to class: 
The real impact of class is that a man can play out 
both sides of the power situation in his own life, 
become alternatively judge and judged, alternatively 
individual and member of the mass. This represents the 
"internalizing" of class conflict, the process by which 
struggle between each man leads to struggle within each 
man. (Sennett & Cobb, 1973, pp. 97-98) 
One example of this confusion is when people, as I, 
come from the working class and enter the academic 
professional class. Such persons must learn the rules of 
the new setting before they are fully accepted into 
academia, although total integration into a college or 
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university is always questionable. Their working-class 
backgrounds act as criteria for separating them from total 
assimilation, a situation which, in turn, can promote 
feelings of frustration. Some academics, who originally 
come from the working class, have had the opportunity to 
tell the story of their frustrations, as in the case of 
Robert Brown: 
I would do it [attend college] again without question. 
To be sure, there have been serious frustrations 
arising from my background, from attending less than 
first-rate colleges and universities, etc. But, I have 
not forgotten the frustration of farm labor, factory 
work, secretarial work, civil servant and naval 
enlisted man. They were so boring much of the time. 
So dead end, it seemed; always on the bottom rung with 
no security, no past, no future. . . (Ryan & Sackrey, 
1984, p. 133) 
Another professor relates additional tensions: 
In the eyes of my father, I'm pretty sure I'm a 
failure. That's a little hard to take, but it helps 
that my mother respects what I do. Respects it, though 
she doesn't really have much understanding of what is 
involved in being a history professor. ... I get 
along well enough with my colleagues, but am not, do 
not choose to be—perhaps could not be—really close to 
them. The only thing—well, the main thing, anyway— 
that really bugs me about them is the game of one-
upmanship . . . and how many books everybody's working 
on that never get published, etc., that takes place, 
especially at professional meetings. I just have to 
get away from that, and mix with some "real"—working 
class?—people. (Ryan & Sackrey, 1984, pp. 235, 241) 
Once more, individuals can doubt the person they are, as 
well as lack acceptance by others in the I-It world. They 
can extend their anxieties onto others and resultingly 
experience difficulty in entering into dialogic 
relationships. They can even perceive themselves to be 
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objects rather than subjects, for oppressed are viewed by an 
oppressor as objects. They need to feel part of a group, as 
"the unity that makes up the self is the unity of social 
organization that makes one feel part of social process, 
where one is ready to put oneself in the position of others" 
(Mead, 1982, p. 164). 
Thus, the frictions and frustrations which many people 
have felt within their relationships have been partially 
influenced by class. It is a factor of American life and 
helps to shape the identity with which one enters into 
relationships. 
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Section 3; 
The Female in the Work World and in Relationships 
Similarly, one who is thrown into existence as a female 
can undergo tension and frustration, for in a male dominant 
society, she can be required to change roles in her 
relationships and to adopt behaviors dependent upon the 
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situation. She must master both male and female domains in 
order to function as a housewife and an employee in a public 
job, occupations which many women hold. She must, 
accordingly, switch from the nurturing and dependent role of 
a homemaker to the efficient and independent behaviors at 
the work world. Such variations within the character have 
decided effects upon her relationships, as well as her self-
evaluation. 
The woman at home traditionally holds an unpaid 
position as wife, caretaker, and helper whose responsibility 
includes the building and maintenance of relationships 
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 17). She is to take care of men and 
children, to run the household, to cook, to clean, and to 
transmit social and moral values. Through her nurturance 
she expends many hours dedicated to the care of others, 
perhaps even to the detriment of v/here her own needs and 
wants suffer as a consequence. She, though, is not socially 
worthy of high recognition for her care-giving jobs, because 
society tends to devalue this type of work. Despite the 
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hours spent in household duties, she enjoys no social 
security credit, wages, or other benefits for her expected 
female behavior. 
From childhood women learn the roles they are supposed 
to play. They are socialized from birth to acquire certain 
behaviors and character traits which stress sensitivity to 
the needs of others. They are trained to take on Cinderella 
behaviors where it becomes a duty, as well as a 
responsibility, to care for others. Following in an 
imitation of their mother, they experience no gender 
separation as infants from her. Instead, they are bonded to 
the primary caregiver, usually the mother, such that they 
come to associate attachment to her as a part of their 
being. Attachment and intimacy that begin with the mother 
distinguish the female, whereas the male tends towards 
separation and autonomy. She consequently begins to define 
herself in terms of her relationships (Gilligan, 1982). 
Men, on the other hand, do not tend to have this close 
connection to personal relationships. Rather, they fear 
intimacy and must undergo separation from their mother to 
differentiate their masculinity from her femininity 
(Dinnerstein, 1976). They come to see relationships, 
especially dependency, differently from a female, to the 
point that "masculinity is defined through separation while 
femininity is defined through attachment, and male gender 
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identity is threatened by intimacy while female gender 
identity is threatened by separation" (Gilligan, 1982, 
p. 8) . 
Hence, men and women are socialized to assume different 
roles, one being traditionally that of agency and 
competition and the other being that of nurturer and 
facilitator. One of the female's main goals comes to be to 
ease conflicting situations so that she can maintain 
connections, whereas he becomes the primary breadwinner. 
Typically, he goes off for work in a socially accepted 
manner, and even as a youth thinks of his place in the world 
as a future worker (Kolbenschlag, 1981, p. 67). She, as a 
little girl, also imagines herself as a worker, although her 
work is usually perceived to be not as important as his. 
She may, instead, identify herself as a wife and a mother, 
for she is under social pressure to concern herself with 
relationships. Her employment tends to become secondary to 
her relationships, although she can be skillful in occupying 
both roles. 
Women are still a vital component to the work force, 
particularly since the cost of living has increased to where 
the wife must supplement the family income. Her wages, 
however, do not tend to equal those of a man. For every one 
dollar he earns, she on the average only makes around sixty-
nine cents (1988 Information Please Almanac, p. 54). It is 
not a question that he works harder than she, only that his 
99 
work tends to be valued more. After all, many work places 
have more male employees than female ones, especially in 
upper level positions. Her place and socialization 
conventionally center around the home, and with her entry 
into the work force, she can undergo a transition from the 
caring and nurturing roles of the traditional female to the 
competitiveness and autonomy of the male in employment. She 
must master both male and female behaviors in order to 
survive, to portray the aggressive woman at work and the 
gentle woman at home. Roberta Victor, a prostitute and 
interviewee in Terkel's Working. expresses this dichotomy 
for a woman: 
The overt hustling society is the microcosm of the rest 
of society. The power relationships are the same and 
the games are the same. Only this one I was in control 
of. The greater one I wasn't. In the outside society 
if I tried to be me, I wasn't in control of anything. 
As a bright, assertive woman, I had no power. As a 
cold, manipulative hustler, I had a lot. I knew I was 
playing a role. Most women are taught to become what 
they act. All I did was act out the reality of 
American womanhood. (Terkel, 1974, p. 103) 
On the whole, because women experience a division between 
the work world and the home place, and between the 
aggressive character and the nurturing role, they are forced 
to become adept at switching roles relevant to the 
situation. 
Taken from a sketch of the hermeneutic circle, a 
drawing can clarify some of the roles which a woman must 
master: 
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dawn 
night \ day > 
home \ employment 
private world \ public world 
dusk 
(Modification of drawing used by Dr. David Purpel) 
A scenario of a traditional, working-class housewife 
experiencing role changes uses dawn and dusk as transitional 
points at which she must don appropriate masks and behaviors 
for the time and setting. That is to say, she arises early 
at dawn, prepares the children's school lunches, fixes 
breakfast for herself and her family, sees the children off 
to school and her husband off to work. She may also prepare 
for work in a change from the nurturing role to the business 
role. Next, our fictional woman heads off for work herself, 
perhaps in a position as a nurse, secretary, teacher, 
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waitress, or the like. Returning from her employment in 
which she must show efficiency, competency, and skill rather 
than care and emotion, she modifies her behavior and mask 
once more to suit the home environment. She resumes the 
caring role for her children and husband, as she prepares 
dinner, monitors the children's homework and bath, sees them 
to bed, takes care of necessary household tasks like laundry 
and ironing, and then retires herself. After a nights's 
sleep, she again participates in the different roles and the 
correlated masks. The duality she endures evinces the I-It 
world and a distancing of the self from her essence. 
Such a housewife, despite social conventions, may be 
argued by scholars now to be a minority figure, due to the 
increase of single-parent families and the remarriage of 
divorced individuals. In the rural area where I grew up, 
such is not the case, for women as my sisters are still 
expected by their husbands to carry out these wifely and 
motherly duties. Even my sisters who hold public jobs must 
learn their nurturing positions and perfect their 
competitive skills at their jobs. In other words, the 
schema I am presenting is one with which I am familiar and 
one for which I was trained as a woman. 
In the midst of such a busy day, a woman is faced with 
the secondary importance of her job and household duties in 
the eyes of society. Before marriage, her time tends to be 
consumed with her choice of a husband, so that any time 
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spent working publicly becomes a waiting period. She likely 
puts off any major career decision until after marriage, for 
once again she devotes herself to her relationships 
(Kolbenschlag, 1981, p. 73). She puts herself on hold until 
the supposedly right man arrives to sweep her away in a 
marital union. 
A man, however, tends to be centered around work. He 
can give his energy to his job which becomes a means for his 
identity. He can go beyond the limits of the family into 
the social world and participate in a productive role. He 
can connect his work with a capacity for growth in a 
transcendence beyond the family unit (De Beauvoir, 1964). 
His time is not to be channelled into a reproduction of the 
species or completion of household duties. When he needs 
security and similarity, he can retreat to his home life. 
As a result, his roles and masks do not contain as large a 
shift as they do for the female. He develops, rather, a 
sense of autonomy and worth which he obtains partly from his 
work. Because society tends to be pieced together from 
masculine fabric, his gender allows him to fit more easily 
into certain social positions and employments. 
I am not saying that women cannot find a sense of 
autonomy from their work. In fact, some do, but the 
tendency of women to see their employment as supplemental or 
to spend their days at home lessens their chance for 
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development and self-growth beyond the family unit. In 
other words: 
Without work, . . . the road to transcendence—to 
autonomy—is blocked. Full development of personality 
implies growth, a succession of acts of self-
transcendence. Or as the philosophers put it, 
"selfhood consists in a continual relationship to the 
possible." (Kolbenschlag, 1981, p. 74) 
In addition, I do not want to lead one to assume that a 
fulfilling career cannot be combined with motherhood. 
Commitment to a project beyond the family can make one into 
an even better mother in a successful combination of roles: 
Many . . . women find that combining work and 
motherhood makes them better at both. Work takes up 
their aggressive energies to shape and achieve, and 
keeps their children from being unduly worked on. They 
can relax with their children and relate to them as 
persons rather than as projects or jobs. Their mutual 
dialogue with their children is enhanced by their work 
outside of the domestic sphere. (Callahan, 1971, p. 46) 
Some women, though, find the role modification to be 
overwhelming or even oppositional. They can become confused 
about themselves in the scheme of things and about the 
importance of relationships in a society that tends to 
undervalue their significance as people. 
I have focused mainly so far upon married women in the 
sense of their definition of self through relationship 
rather than work. I, though, as many other women am not 
married and do not give my time largely to the nurturance of 
a family. I work as a teaching assistant, in addition to 
being a student, and find that many of my hours are spent in 
preparation or performance of my job. Yet, despite my 
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single state, I still feel pressures to conform to the 
traditional role of a female, to marry, and to bear 
children. Although I have some sense of autonomy, I do not 
think I have gone beyond the work role to the point where I 
can find self-fulfillment from my employment with which to 
enter into relationships. Rather, my energies are spent on 
activities necessary for survival. While I believe in the 
importance of work leading towards an extension of the self, 
I think that this connection of transcendence to employment 
refers only to certain types of work, jobs usually occupied 
by men. Custodians or waitresses may not achieve the same 
sense of fulfillment or of being needed as a medical doctor 
would. De Beauvoir's (1964) reference to work furthering 
transcendence seems to infer work of a certain caliber and 
with a particular pay scale. 
As long as women find employment to be a secondary 
occupation, it will be difficult for them to aspire towards 
transcendence. They usually are working because they must 
or because they need a diversion from their family life. 
Hence, the job often is alien to their nature or interests, 
so that they cannot fit into some types of employment with 
the same ease as a male and, consequently, further their 
identity from its primary focus on relationships. 
Women, overall, need to refocus their identities from a 
definition through relationships to include a definition 
beyond relationships, another identity of the self. One 
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avenue for this redirection lies in finding fulfilling 
employment, to the point where "work is an essential part of 
being alive. Your work is your identity. It tells you who 
you are" (Terkel, 1972, p. 470). With a sense of the self 
beyond the family, women can combine their care of others 
with a care of the self, to balance one with the other 
rather than being associated only with serving others. 
Then, they can prevent the pitfall of glorifying work as a 
substitution for relationships. By balancing work with 
relationships, the self with others, women can modify their 
position in society and as a consequence even society 
itself. Otherwise, they will remain in thoughts and 
perceptions as subservient to the male, a blockage to a 
dialogic encounter. The work place demands to be changed 
from its masculine nature; with women's equal participation, 
it can be altered into a more humane setting. 
One may recall from chapter one a different sense of 
transcendence to which Buber refers. He sees the ultimate 
transcendence to lie in a particular type of relationship, 
or the I-Thou and I-Eternal Thou. An individual's 
experience of this relationship makes him or her more 
human. I am not opposing Buber's notion of transcendence 
but fully support it. What I am saying, though, is for 
women to have other forms of transcendence available to 
them. After all, one cannot seek an I-Thou union, which 
may, in turn, never occur for an individual. When it does 
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happen, it is through grace in the present moment, to 
exemplify a spiritual dimension to the transcendence. Thus, 
while women should keep Buber's transcendence in mind, they 
should also have some control over other means of extending 
themselves beyond the family for fulfillment. Work is one 
such avenue, on which I have concentrated. I am not ruling 
out other possibilities for transcendence, for I think they 
can and do exist, but I am firm in my belief that women, 
like other human beings, should have several avenues for 
both earthly and spiritual transcendence available to them. 
All in all, women are caught within confusion. Just as 
the work place tends to exemplify masculine values and the 
home, feminine caring, the female, who becomes skillful at 
both roles, must learn to broaden her scope and the 
importance she places on her employment if she wishes to be 
defined beyond relationships. The socially dualistic 
perceptions of masculine and feminine qualities, in my eyes, 
demand to be replaced by human characteristics. In other 
words, the work world needs to demonstrate a caring 
environment, while men need to realign their focus to make 
relationships as important as careers. In this way, women 
have the potential power to shake off Cinderella behaviors 
of passive servitude and duty. Women then would no longer 
care from a sense of female duty but from a belief in human 
responsibility. They can furthermore experience a social 
transcendence beyond their family to promote personal 
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fulfillment. As long as they stay mainly centered on family 
relationships, the significance of which society is 
reluctant to acknowledge, they will continue to be entrapped 
as objects in a masculine rather than human world. Many 
women hope: 
That a women not ask a man to leave meaningful work to 
follow her. 
That a man not ask a woman to leave meaningful work to 
follow Jhim. 
That no one try to put Eros in bondage. 
But that no one put a cudgel in the hands of Eros. 
That our loyalty to one another and our loyalty to our 
work not be set in false conflict. 
That our love for each other gives us love for each 
other's work. 
That our love for each other's work give us love for 
one another. . . . 
That our love for each other give us love for each 
other's work. 
That our love for each other, if need be, give way to 
absence. And the unknown. 
That we endure absence, if need be, without losing our 
love for each other. 
Without closing our doors to the unknown. (Levertov, 
1975, p. 97) 
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Section 4; 
Being Southern 
Introduction 
Being Southern involves a large number of expectations 
and connotations which the word South tends to evoke. We 
talk in terms of Southern ladies, Southern hillbillies, 
Southern poor whites, Southern gentlemen, and so on. Most 
Americans can easily typify someone into these categories, 
for we have been taught to define people with associations 
and labels, from a Southern lady with images of Scarlett 
O'Hara to a mountain hillbilly with pictures of Snuffy Smith 
or the Beverly Hillbillies. We tend to look for certain 
defining traits or conditions in order to categorize people 
into typologies that, in turn, provide some linkage to a 
mythology pervading the South and the concept of being 
Southern. After all, Southerners have been seen as "a 
mythological people, created half out of dream and half out 
of slander, who live in a still legendary land" (Tindall, 
1976, p. 43). 
In general, we carry with us much mental baggage 
originating from our mythology. We associate the South with 
pictures of the genteel plantation, with ladies in hoop 
skirts and men leaving home to fight the Civil War for honor 
and the preservation of a certain life style. We connect it 
with slavery, segregation, and oppression towards blacks and 
109 
women. Other images include the mountaineer in overalls, 
the rolling fields of tobacco and cotton, the poor 
sharecropping families, and the burgeoning industrial 
cities. We build within our minds mental structures to give 
us a distinct sense of the South. Our associations furnish 
us with a way to define and differentiate it from other 
regions, as well as build up myths which connect Southerners 
to the area. 
Not only does the mythology link Southerners to one 
another, it also emphasizes certain common elements which 
they share. These commonalities automatically provide a 
superficial basis for a relationship, because Southerners 
have to some extent undergone similar sub-cultural 
influences. The language around them, for instance, has 
drawn-out vowel sounds and many of the same dialects. 
Similarly, the native cuisine tends to have a fried quality, 
as in fried chicken, fried ham, fried okra, fried tomatoes, 
etc. Having remembrances of a lost war, Southerners too 
have had a sense of defeat. They have had some of their 
faults nationally denounced and originate from ancestors who 
have participated in forming a similar history. 
Despite its common elements, though, the Southern 
mythology can additionally create tensions within and among 
individuals, for the mythological images which surround the 
South can serve as role models or sticks against which to 
measure behaviors. One uses his or her knowledge of 
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Scarlett's ties to the land, as an example, to compare with 
a housewife's devotion to her garden or the strong drawing 
tendency of some Southerners to remain in the South. One 
grows up within the mythology and may not realize how 
ingrained it is in his or her consciousness. Even when he 
or she realizes its existence, it is still there to contend 
with. One comes up against the connotations of being 
Southern or against its mythology both in his or her self-
evaluation and relationships. In other words, we tend to 
expect certain aspects when we learn that one is from the 
South—a type of manners, a mode of behavior, and a 
particular manner of speech. 
My consciousness of the South, besides coming from 
studies of Southern literature and history, is confined to 
the rural Piedmont of North Carolina and the mountain 
foothills of Virginia, so that when I talk about being 
Southern, my information or statements may not be 
generalizable to the deeper South or to an urban 
environment. Although I have travelled in and know people 
from different Southern states, I still do not have their 
experiential base of personalized knowledge. Therefore, my 
use of the term South is limited, but I will try to broaden 
my physical experiences with information gained from other 
sources. 
One must acknowledge, moreover, that the presence of a 
mythology is one form of a hegemonic construct. The 
mythological imagery is part of an identity and works to 
mold people into forms that conform to social expectations. 
It also supports hierarchies through acceptable practices, 
as in a polite "yes sir," and can create a strong root to 
the past functioning against change. I will examine two 
aspects of the Southern mythology, namely the factor of 
manners and the sense of history, to see how they influence 
our relationships hegemonically. 
Southern Manners 
In one light, manners are an aspect that many 
Southerners, like me, have internalized to the point that 
they become part of the character. One is taught to show 
respect towards others by the creation of a hierarchy where 
he or she lowers the self and promotes the other through 
practices as language. Phrases as "yes sir," "pardon me," 
and "excuse me," which one can say many times each day, are 
in actuality asking the other to forgive one's identity or 
are supporting the other through compliance. He or she 
tends not to say words as "excuse my clumsiness" when he or 
she accidentally steps on the toes of another but, instead, 
says "excuse me," the person one is. Then, titles like 
"sir" and "mam" advance the listener over the speaker in a 
possible object-subject relationship where the speaker 
becomes an object below the listener. Hence, he or she is 
negating a subject-subject relationship merely through 
language. 
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Manners, however, comprise more that just language. 
They must be joined by certain actions, many of which tend 
to place the performer in a subservient position. When one 
gives one's seat to another, then that person can be 
acknowledging the right of the other to sit while he or she 
stands. On the other hand, the individual standing may feel 
ennobled through his or her actions. After all one was 
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generous enough to give up a seat. In either case, though, 
manners become somewhat artificial as they entail some 
purpose or design. They admit the objectification of the 
speaker or listener. 
Hence, manners demonstrate subservience on the part of 
the speaker or performer, although they can simultaneously 
be used to manipulate the other in an I-It relationship. 
Because one is acknowledging to a degree respect for the 
other through language or behavior, frequently the listener 
is pleased or impressed by the manners of the other. In 
some cases the listener may even attribute humility to the 
other for his or her politeness. It is almost as though the 
mannerly one is stacking the deck in his or her favor, just 
through the use of certain words or actions, to receive a 
favorable reaction from the listener. Inasmuch as one uses 
manners consciously for such a purpose, they become 
inauthentic. They change from politeness into a social tool 
to be employed in a usage of the other person. 
Manners are still a phenomenon which society tends to 
advocate overall. I know that my mother continually 
hammered their importance into me, so that I complied with 
her requests and said or performed certain actions without 
critically thinking about what I was saying or what I was 
doing. I was taught that it was mannerly to be quiet when 
adults wanted to speak and that it was mannerly to give my 
chair to an elderly man or woman. Likewise, I learned to 
conform to social practices as putting a napkin in my lap, 
not to talk with my mouth full, and to keep my elbows off 
the table. Practices as the above seem to allow for social 
conformity and, to an extent, to permit people to live with 
one another in a type of order or harmony. At the same 
time, they act as practices that control the actions of the 
other. I was certainly reprimanded if I put my elbows on 
the table, and I conformed to the more of keeping my elbows 
off. Now, I wonder what this behavior accomplishes besides 
an unquestioning support of the society. When I conform, in 
other words, I give in to and even maintain through my 
compliance the hegemonic structure. 
Yet, I do not want to portray polite manners in a 
totally negative light. One of their purposes is a 
demonstration of respect to others and a recognition of 
their dignity as human beings, as well as being a way of 
allowing some unity between an individual and a community 
through social and conventional practices. These goals are 
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noble in themselves, with the result that if one is mannerly 
as part of his or her behavior and with no conscious motives 
behind his or her actions, then manners may be seen as 
authentic. Even if they are genuine, they should, though, 
encompass no abnegation of the self but rather allow for a 
respect for the self as well as for the other. Only in this 
way can one make himself or herself open for a dialogic 
relationship. 
Indeed, I seem to be once more in some confusion, for I 
am asking for a redefinition of manners in a relationship, 
where they become true symbols of respect rather than being 
used for other conscious and manipulatory purposes. If we 
employ manners as a recognition of the other as subject, 
they can involve no sense of subservience of one person to 
another. Too often, though, my use of manners has been to 
the reverse, where I have acknowledged the power or 
dominance of another over me, be it to a landlord, teacher, 
professor, or the like. What I would like to see is a time 
where manners, so much a part of Southern life, change with 
a modification of the society, where all persons can become 
subjects to one another. 
A Southerner's Sense of History 
Each one of us too comes into the world with a long 
line of ancestors. They form our heritage, the roots from 
which we originate. Thus, in order to have a sense of 
belonging, one must come to terms with not only his or her 
past but also with that of one's forefathers and 
foremothers. We can in this way gain more self-knowledge to 
go out into the world and encounter others, for "what has 
been is what will be, / and what has been done is what will 
be done; / and there is nothing new under the sun" 
(Ecclesiastes, 1:9). We are what we have been, what we are, 
and what we will become as we meet one another in the 
present moment. Our identity includes our history. 
A major part of the Southern past lies in the Civil 
War. Not only was life changed for Southerners but they 
also experienced defeat "and a time of reconstruction. They 
were shown through the devastation of war that slavery was 
wrong, as they picked up the pieces to start over again. 
Many Southerners, thus, have heard stories about their 
relatives who fought in the Civil War. These Southerners 
share some ideas about the strength and commitment their 
ancestors had for the land where they lived, even to the 
point of dying for their beliefs. For example, when I was a 
child my mother told me stories about my great-grandfather 
and his brothers who had volunteered for the Confederate 
army. She recounted tales she had heard, about how they 
would walk through the snow barefoot or with pieces of 
material tied around their feet. My great-grandfather, 
according to the narration, was even too young for service, 
but because he felt so strongly about standing up. for the 
South, he lied about his age. He joined a regiment with his 
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brothers, all of whom were killed in battle. Only my great­
grandfather returned to the Blue Ridge mountains to relate 
the atrocities of war and the deprivations he had suffered 
as a soldier. 
Such histories connect one to an area, so that he or 
she has a sense of belonging. They are not only personal 
pasts but also fit in as a segment of the overall textbook 
history. If he or she leaves the region, then he or she may 
not have the same feeling of roots, although the distance 
can serve as a lens through which to view his or her past. 
For clarification, take the case of Faulkner's (1936) 
Quentin Compson in Absalom. Absalom1. who leaves 
Yoknapatawpha County to attend Harvard. At Harvard, he 
tries to understand the history of people with whom his 
grandfather and he have known. His roommate Shreve, a 
Northerner, and he take stories and rumors to reconstruct a 
plausible narrative. Quentin is physically distanced from 
his home in Mississippi, while Shreve serves as an outsider 
who lacks the commitment to the history that Quentin has. 
Shreve even admits his lack of involvement: 
Listen. I'm not trying to be funny, smart. I just 
want to understand it if I can and I don't know how to 
say it better. Because it's something my people 
haven't got. . . a kind of entailed birthright ... of 
never forgiving General Sherman, so that forevermore as 
long as your children's children produce children you 
won't be anything but a descendant of a long line of 
colonels killed in Pickett's charge. . . .(Faulkner, 
1936, p. 361) 
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Both characters, though, can never be sure of the accuracy 
of their history, as: 
Most important of all. . . Absalom. Absalom! is a 
persuasive commentary upon the thesis that much of 
"•history" is really a kind of imaginative construction. 
The past always remains at some level a mystery, but if 
we are to hope to understand it in any wise, we must 
enter into it and project ourselves imaginatively into 
the attitudes and emotions of the historical figures. 
(Brooks, 1963, pp. 311-312) 
Hence, their very reconstruction is vital to the sense of 
connection. If individuals do not in some way acknowledge 
their history, refashion it through a retelling, they cannot 
make the history their own. They then can be severing ties 
with the past or denying their link to the South. The 
Northerner, like Quentin's distance from home, allows for 
the gaining of some perspective on the events. At home, 
Quentin is too close to the story and to the people 
involved, whereas at Harvard his history becomes important 
in a discovery of the person he is threaded into the stories 
of his ancestors. 
Similarly, just as histories revolve around the 
strength and courage of men, Southern women have shown 
emotional strength and courage in holding families together 
and in keeping the farms productive. Some wives have had to 
plow the fields, tend to the gardens and animals, split 
wood, and carry on similar activities to guarantee their 
survival and that of their children and other loved ones. 
Judith Sutpen in Absalom. Absalom! shows this strength. She 
nurses her half-brother Charles Bon back to health from the 
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yellow fever, cares for his son, and then later dies from 
yellow fever contracted from Charles. Likewise, Ada 
Fincastle in Ellen Glasgow's (1963) Vein of Iron 
demonstrates the steadfastness of the female during the 
Depression. She concludes that: 
She had a sense, more a feeling than a vision, of the 
dead generations behind her. They had come to life 
there in the past; they were lending her their 
fortitude; they were reaching out to her in adversity; 
this was the heritage they had left. She could lean 
back on their strength, she could recover that lost 
certainty of a continuing tradition. (Glasgow, 1963, 
p. 404) 
Thus, Southerners, like me, feel that they are one in a long 
line of forefathers and foremothers. Their own life is 
unified by theirs, for: 
Units, because they are experiences, have already taken 
shape; from an endless, countless multiplicity, a 
selection of what is worth recording has been prepared. 
Between the parts we see a connection which neither is, 
nor is it intended to be, the simple likeness of the 
course of a life or so many years, but which, because 
understanding is involved, expresses what the 
individual knows about the continuity of his life. 
(Dilthey, 1961, p. 86) 
Their history implies a relationship with the past as well 
as with the future, with what has occurred and what will 
happen. It gives them an understanding of the potentials of 
the human character in a certain environment and particular 
situation and furnishes them with a deeper sense of self-
knowledge to use in relationships with others. It can 
provide them, furthermore, with a sense of connection which 
they can fasten onto as a shield against social alienation, 
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a commonality to unite one to the other in a relationship of 
a similar history with humanity. 
Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that in our 
narration of a history, we can romanticize the events. We 
often do not look critically at the past inasmuch as we tend 
to see it as better than the present. This backward looking 
tends to hinder a view towards the future, where one 
perception is in conflict with the other. I hold that such 
a tendency functions hegemonically to depower individuals. 
They can become so engrossed in a search for the past, a 
time period which can never be regained, that their energies 
are mischannelled. They frequently overlook the tragedies 
or unfavorable events in favor of their more advantageous 
restructuring of the past. In general, the lack of critical 
thought acts against critical consciousness, against a 
praxis of power and liberation, and against change in the 
future. 
Looking back supports the status quo of the oppressors 
and the oppressed in their subject-object encounters. So, 
we once more are entrapped by a tension where being Southern 
gives us a sense of unification with others but can, at the 
same time, function against the attainment of a critical 
perspective. 
When we review traits with which we are thrown into 
existence, namely class, gender, and sub-culture, we are 
faced with conditions which can work as boundaries in a 
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Freirian and Buberian subject-to-subject dialogic 
relationship, yet not in a Buberian I-Thou encounter. Class 
suggests a hierarchy of one level over another, despite the 
mythology of the American dream that negates the 
significance of class. Likewise, women are socially 
connected to relationships, just as men are associated with 
the work world. I propose that women, besides the 
transcendence in I-Thou relationships, should seek another 
level of transcendence through a fulfilling career. This 
would demand a restructuring of the employment environment 
from masculine to human and of relationships from feminine 
to human. Then, we consider sub-culture, where being 
Southern operates to put one in a hierarchy through a 
consciousness of courtesy, deference, and manners, in 
addition to joining one with others through a similar 
history. Yet, all three traits can sustain the hegemonic 
dominance of some individuals over others and affect, as a 
result, our personal relationships. We become involved 
within tensions of supporting but not totally upholding the 
various complexities of our class, gender, and sub-culture. 
The self-knowledge we gain, as we look at parts and 
pieces of our life, influences our relationships and 
knowledge about autobiography. I find that I was taught the 
subservient female position in a patriarchal family and also 
had ingrained within me the practice of hard work. The 
labor, however, was not a satisfying kind because it was 
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primarily centered around survival. As I was a daughter of 
a sharecropper, I discovered early the oppression centered 
around class, while I additionally made Southernness part of 
my identity. All three traits of class, gender, and sub­
culture affect my self-knowledge, and consequently, my 
relationships with others. 
Still, my .early experiences and my years in the Peace 
Corps and at college have shown me some of the limitations 
for relationships present from birth, which I must overcome 
and which I have considered in this chapter. The results of 
our class, gender, and sub-culture include alienation and 
marginality, subjects for my next chapter, as we examine the 
end products of these boundaries on relationships. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EFFECTS OF LIMITATIONS ON RELATIONSHIPS: 
MARGINALITY AND ALIENATION 
Introduction 
In chapter one I briefly examined selected theories of 
relationships, primarily those of Buber, Freire, and Welch, 
while in chapter two I looked at factors affecting our 
relationships. These aspects—our self-knowledge, class, 
gender, and sub-culture—act as parts of our identity and, 
in turn, affect our perceptions of ourselves and our 
relationships with others. Eventually we must brave the 
results they have on our relationships, how they can work to 
distance us from ourselves and others to the point of 
marginality or alienation. 
I plan in this chapter to consider another dimension of 
relationships, where one is placed in situations of 
aloneness or of a lack of participation. To help develop 
these themes, I will turn once more to a mixture of 
fictional and non-fictional references, besides using both 
philosophical and sociological perspectives. The 
philosophical view supplies us with a possible explanation 
for the existence of marginality and alienation, whereas the 
sociological side brings to light a political orientation. 
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All of these perspectives illumine facets of marginality and 
alienation to help us better understand the concepts. 
Likewise, because the tension between theory and 
practice evident in relationships remains with us throughout 
our existence, we cannot have a neatly constructed sense of 
concluding our relational practices, needs, and aspirations. 
Rather, we are engaged in an on-going process of 
strengthening, changing, and forming ties with others, with 
nature, and with God. For this reason, I am using the 
material of this chapter as a stopping place for my 
dissertation research and have intertwined many of my own 
thoughts with analyses of the works of other theorists. 
Because I have used my experiences and knowledge as 
support for the dialectic between theory and experience, 
much of this dissertation has been very personal in tone. I 
have grappled with the consequences of my class, gender, and 
sub-culture throughout my life and am drawn into some 
conflict about the way I feel about them. Present at birth, 
these facets have helped to place me into positions of 
marginality and alienation, that have led, on one hand, to a 
sense of aloneness. Yet, on the other hand, my distance 
from the social mainstream has allowed me the chance to step 
back and look critically at the events happening around me 
which highlights not only my own life but the lives of 
others and the nature of our culture. Through such 
separation I can re-examine myself and my relationships to 
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enter once more into them. Distance thus furnishes the 
opportunity to see more clearly the trappings of society. 
This perspective of marginality and alienation—distancing 
and its inferences of oppression, disempowerment, and 
estrangement—will form the focus of this chapter. 
The Distancing of Marginality and Alienation 
We employ words as marginality and alienation 
frequently, perhaps even as synonyms, but the two nouns 
actually have some differences within their meanings. 
Marginality involves notions of distance and exclusion at a 
level beyond the family, where one is not involved in some 
forms of participation (Germani, 1980, pp. 3-5). 
Alienation, likewise, connotes separation, yet the term does 
not necessarily pertain to communal participation. To 
clarify, persons can be alienated to the state of 
marginality or feel alienated when they are participatory, 
although in whichever case, alienation and marginality both 
indicate a distance from others, power, and culture. 
Besides distance, differentiation is also mandatory for 
the occurrence of alienation (Kaplan, 1976, p. 120). We can 
distinguish ourselves from others physically, as in the case 
where some of us have brown eyes and others have blue. Our 
separateness is emphasized by our names at birth and then in 
the establishment of an identity. Heightened by aspects of 
our personalities, our individuality, and the society around 
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us, the differentiation among us leads us to a perception of 
ourselves as single, unique beings. 
In a way, marginality too exemplifies differentiation 
of one from other persons to a degree, but it can also 
result from individuals' choices to exclude themselves from 
participation, when they purposefully distance themselves 
from others in a type of Buberian monologic existence. It 
can, furthermore, come about through social pressure leading 
to alienation. Whatever the cause, the commonality of 
persons with others is questioned, and their feeling of 
individuality can be heightened. They stand without a 
definite sense of place or belonging, such an experience of 
separation having probable end products of disempowerment 
and isolation. 
I hold that most people have experienced aloneness or 
alienation at some point in their lives, though the degrees 
of distancing may vary. Some persons are on the edges of 
society, whether because of poverty, gender, or political 
and religious beliefs, while others are in some situations 
participatory and in others estranged. In such instances, 
people share in the differences in amount, intensity, 
quality, and degree of participation. 
Hence, with marginality, as with alienation, comes a 
feeling of individuality, an essential experience for 
relationships. Individuals must have a sense of the "I" 
before they can enter into a "we." Otherwise, their 
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principle of being has not been defined in a comparison 
between themselves and others (Heschel, 1965). They must 
distance themselves from others in order to enter 
relationships in a dialectic between being marginal and 
participatory, of the self and the other, of powerless and 
power. They engage in a process that: 
. . . the principle of human life is not simple but 
twofold, being built up in a twofold movement which is 
of such kind that the one movement is the 
presupposition of the other. I propose to call the 
first movement 'the primal setting at a distance1 and 
the second 'entering into relation.' That the first 
movement is the presupposition of the other is plain 
from the fact that one can enter into relation only 
with being which has been set at a distance, more 
precisely, has become an independent opposite. (Buber, 
1965b, p. 60) 
Without an actualization of the I, the relationships of an 
I-Thou or an I-It cannot occur. One must first realize the 
separation of the baby being unconnected to one's mother, 
for the child in his or her realization becomes a separate 
being, body, and consciousness: 
But once the I of the relation has emerged and has 
become existent in its detachment, it somehow 
etherializes and functionalizes itself and enters into 
the natural fact of the discreteness of the body from 
its environment, awakening I-likeness in it. Only now 
can the conscious I act, the first form of the basic 
word I-It, of experience by an I, come into being. The 
I which has emerged proclaims itself as the carrier of 
sensations and the environment as their object. (Buber, 
1970, p. 74) 
The I, with its recognition, has the potential to transcend 
the separateness into a reunification with beings. Distance 
is essential for relationships, the I for an I-Thou or an I-
It, just as relationships are necessary for one to perceive 
himself or herself as human. 
To provide an example of the distancing of marginality 
and alienation, I find my thoughts going towards stories 
that illustrate how the severance of ties functions. 
Faulkner (1932) especially portrays marginality and 
alienation in works as Light in August, which concerns the 
actions of a man Joe Christmas alienated from society 
because of his lack of a race. Joe is a classic case of 
estrangement from the self and the community, "the most 
solitary character in American fiction, the most extreme 
phase conceivable of American loneliness" (Kazin, 1966, pp. 
151-152). A man with no background, roots, or certain race, 
he is deposited as a baby on Christmas Eve at the steps of 
an orphanage where he mockingly acquires his name. A 
childhood experience labels him as a "nigger;" with no 
biological parents, though, his race is ambiguous, perhaps 
white or black or both. He searches for a stable identity, 
as he cannot live with both possibilities—black and white. 
The Southern society of his time clearly outlines certain 
expectations and patterns on how he should behave in either 
instance, but he has no model on whom he can pattern his 
character. As a result, Joe's emotional sense of himself 
conflicts with the social demands put on him. He cannot 
accept his white skin because he fears that he is part 
black, while if his skin were black, then he would know of 
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his race. His whiteness leaves room for doubt, so that Joe 
does not fit into the community. The town perceives him, 
parallel to his racial mistrust, in contradictions, shown by 
the predominance of buts and vet nots in the following 
description: 
He looked like a tramp, yet not like a tramp either. 
His shoes were dusty and his trousers were soiled too. 
But they were of decent serge, sharply creased, and his 
shirt was soiled but it was a white^ shirt, and he wore 
a tie and a stiffbrim straw hat that was quite new, 
cocked at an angle arrogant and baleful above his still 
face. He did not look like a professional hobo in his 
professional rags, but there was something definitely 
rootless about him, as though no town nor city was his, 
no street, no walls, no square of earth his home. 
(Faulkner, 1932, p. 27) 
This lack of an identity leaves Joe estranged from himself 
and from the people around him. He has little ground for 
racial or cultural certainty and associations. 
His alienation partially results from the rigidity of 
the social norms. The environment seems to be committed to 
defining people in terms of their race and cannot accept the 
possibility of an ambiguity in his whiteness or blackness. 
A black occupies one position in the Yoknapatawpha county 
town, while a white resides in another. There is no 
category for one of mixed races. The whites will not accept 
him as white and the blacks will not accept him as black. 
Despite Joe's attempts to live in both white and black 
areas, he is kept from integrating with a race by his own 
ambivalence and by that of the Jefferson citizens. 
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Furthermore, this character doubts his own existence 
(Mortimer, 1983, p. 20). His sense of the self as an object 
is severed from the self as an subject. He acts 
aggressively in order to have his existence affirmed by 
others. Seeming to have some need fulfilled by severe 
punishment, he wills and initiates violence in the other 
party: 
When the strap fell, he did not flinch, no quiver 
passed his face. He was looking straight ahead, with a 
rapt, calm expression like a monk in a picture. 
McEachern [Joe's adopted father] began to strike 
methodically, with slow and deliberate force, still 
without heat or anger. It would have been hard to say 
which face was the more rapt, more calm, more 
convinced. (Faulkner, 1932, p. 140) 
In another beating: 
. . . perhaps the boy [Joe] knew that he [McEachern] 
already held the strap in his hand. It rose and fell, 
deliberate, numbered, with deliberate flat reports. 
The boy's body might have been wood or stone; a post or 
a tower upon which the sentient part of him mused like 
a hermit, contemplative and remote with ecstasy and 
selfcrucifixion. . . He felt like an eagle: hard, 
sufficient, potent, remorseless, strong. (Faulkner, 
1932, p. 150) 
McEachern employs violence to affirm systematically Joe's 
existence and thus recognizes the youth's autonomy by his 
capacity to endure pain. Joe realizes his humanness with 
each fall of the strap, while he suffers the pain needed to 
confirm the person he is. Demonstrating the essence of an 
identity, Joe must know who he is before he can encounter 
certain types of relationships. 
Because of his ambivalence, Joe can never achieve a 
whole unity of the self, and he knows that he never will 
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(Mortimer, 1983, p. 12). He is black, but not black, and 
white, but not white. The fact that his body remains 
largely foreign to him is reflected in the distance and 
detachment he takes from himself when he is attacked: 
Lying peaceful and still Joe watched the stranger lean 
down and lift his head from the floor and strike him 
again in the face, this time with a short slashing 
blow. After a moment he licked his lip a little, 
somewhat as a child might lick a cooking spoon. He 
watched the stranger's hand go back, but it did not 
fall. (Faulkner, 1932, p. 205) 
Joe's body becomes an it, an object separated from the self, 
as he tries to drag himself outside: 
If I can iust get it outside, into the air, the cool 
air, the cool dark. He watched his hands fumbling at 
the door, trying to help them, to coax and control 
them. 'Anyway, they didn't lock it on me,' he 
thought. . . 'It never would have opened a window and 
climbed through it.' (Faulkner, 1932, p. 210) 
This objectification is another form of disempowerment, for 
he does not acknowledge himself as a subject to go forth 
into a subject-to-subject relationship. 
All in all, Joe Christmas is severely alienated from 
himself and the community. Part of his aloofness comes from 
his questionable race and the town's racist response to it. 
He too, however, chooses his destiny, because he could 
identify with one race and live in accordance to its social 
mores and expectations. Having open before him at least 
one possible pathway, he decides not to follow that road but 
instead to travel in circles, his thoughts switching back 
and forth from white-black to black-white. He cannot extend 
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himself and his individuality to encompass others although 
he has no biological family. He shows us the self-
destruction to which aloneness can carry one. When the town 
turns against him, he is entrapped within his individuality 
and the tensions of a desire to relate within conditions 
hindering associations. 
We can gain from Faulkner's tale an idea that sometimes 
marginality and alienation are beyond our control, social 
forces determining the degree of the complementary pattern 
of one with the community. I also have experienced this 
separateness, not because of race but because of gender and 
economic class, and become frustrated when I am not allowed 
or do not have the resources to participate fully. My 
frustrations are furthered when I realize the political 
implications of oppression behind marginality and 
alienation. 
Political Correspondents to Marginality and Alienation: 
Oppression. Disempowerment. and Individuality 
When people are cut off from participation beyond the 
family unit, they are often serving as the victims of 
actions rather than as actors themselves, for they have 
selected or been denied the right to participate. They have 
experiences done to them or for them but not with them. 
That is to say, they become the oppressed merely by not 
recognizing their power as human beings with certain 
inherent rights to form their own decisions. They can even 
become resigned to the domination of those who do 
participate and through their passivity support their 
oppression. Overall, implicit within marginality and 
alienation lies a contradiction to humanness, for the state 
of aloneness negates the betweenness and dialogue which men 
and women must experience to undergo a fuller humanity than 
the monologic condition (Buber, 1970). 
One can, furthermore, accept alienation in an 
internalization of oppression and a rationalization of one's 
lack of participation. Excuses can always be found to make 
passivity seem reasonable. Persons can say that they do not 
have the power to change oppression and to end their 
alienation, that they know the boundaries of their current 
state, and that the unknown future can hold dangers and 
pain. This attitude exemplifies hegemony at work, which 
partially explains why marginality exists. If certain 
people or sectors can be made to feel powerless, then they 
can be separated from others to lessen their social 
contributions, or they can be alienated from others to 
become powerless to instigate change (Gramsci, 1971). In 
both perspectives marginality is tied to disempowerment and 
connected to alienation in a circular pattern. One can 
cause the other which can promote the other. All are 
interrelated concepts. 
As a result, one, alone by himself or herself, often 
lacks the strength or the courage to connect with others. 
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Pride can stand in the way, for we mistakenly think that by 
needing others, we are admitting a weakness or deficiency in 
ourselves and our independence. We remain passive, 
frustrated, and powerless, molded into the sequence of 
performing actions for people and not with them. Implying a 
hierarchical metaphor, the preposition for illuminates the 
"assumption of a dichotomy between man and the world: man is 
merely in the world, not with the world or with others; man 
is spectator, not re-creator" (Freire, 1986, p. 62). We 
perform actions for individuals, with implications of a 
hierarchical relationship, and not with them, more in line 
with a subject-to-subject encounter. 
In one's present reality, however, hierarchies 
definitely exist, from bosses to the President of the United 
States. Our life and employment styles are based around one 
person having power over others. With the inequality which 
results, people can become unable to meet their need for 
independence and self-meaning in the structure of 
domination. They can begin to feel as puppets at the call 
of the master, without a recognition of their power as human 
beings. This domination, itself, becomes alienating: 
It maintains the oppressed I in a position of 
"adhesion" to a reality which seems all-powerful and 
overwhelming, and then alienates him by presenting 
mysterious forces to explain this power. Part of the 
oppressed I is located in the reality to which he 
"adheres"; part is located outside himself, in the 
mysterious forces which he regards as responsible for a 
reality about which he can do nothing. He is divided 
between an identical past and present, and a future 
without hope. He is a person who does not perceive 
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himself as becoming; hence he cannot have a future to 
be built in unity with others. (Freire, 1986, pp. 
173-174) 
People in such a case do not attempt to integrate the notion 
of themselves as subjects with themselves as objects and do 
not tend to realize their full identities. Rather, they 
exist alone and powerless, perhaps needing help but not 
asking for it. 
Without someone or something to oppress individuals, 
one cannot be oppressed, although he or she can be the 
oppressor as well as the oppressed, depending upon the 
actions one is taking (Welch, 1985). People can work as 
factory laborers who subserviently follow orders, oppressed 
beings who are dehumanized by their employment and 
employers. They can go home and vent their frustrations on 
a family member, where they become the oppressor and the 
second party, the oppressed. Consequently, they can occupy 
both roles, which are interdependent upon one another. 
Overall, to be an oppressor indicates some participation 
with other people. The scope of activity determines the 
marginal sector, for, in a parallel vein of thought, 
marginality cannot exist without an oppositional sense of 
participation. 
One can thus be in a dual position, as the experience 
of power or freedom in one instance and lack of power and 
freedom in another can lead to feelings of uneasiness and 
discontent. Because of the dichotomy within people's 
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existence, they have difficulty in living authentically. It 
is like they occupy two positions on different poles and the 
distance between the ends leads to a split in their 
innermost being, oppressed and oppressor, marginal and 
participant. They are in a position between "acting and 
having the illusion of acting through the action of the 
oppressors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated 
in . . . power to create and re-create, ... to transform 
the world" (Freire, 1986, p. 33). They, like Faulkner's Joe 
Christmas, can come to doubt their identity in an alienation 
from themselves, where they as an object question themselves 
as a subject. 
In a like manner, Bellah and his colleagues (1985) 
depict alienation in ways which add to Faulkner's (1932) 
portrayals, as well as provide examples which extend our 
understanding of individuality. The bond which ties the 
husband, wife, and children together as a unit leads to 
mores which parallel those of the culture (Bellah, Madsen, 
Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985, p. 92). Persons are 
taught by their parents to be independent, and reliance upon 
others becomes a sign of weakness. Rather, individuals are 
to take pride in their strong individuality. They even 
leave home to establish their own separate existences, but 
they are not taught about the darker side of oneness. They 
are not taught that their ideology of an upward economic 
progress entails alienation. They are duped in many ways 
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into adopting behaviors that hinder their recognition of 
their brotherhood and sisterhood. Individuals learn to view 
families as separate entities, each an isolated group within 
the larger framework: 
. . . the family is no longer an integral part of a 
larger moral ecology tying the individual to community, 
church, and nation. The family is the core of the 
private sphere, whose aim is not to link individuals to 
the public world but to avoid it as far as possible. 
In our commercial culture, consumerism, with its 
temptations, and television, with its examples, augment 
that tendency. Americans are seldom as selfish as the 
therapeutic culture urges them to be. But often the 
limit of their serious altruism is the family circle. 
Thus the tendency of our individualism to dispose 'each 
citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows 
and withdraw into the circle of family and friends,1 
. . . indeed seems to be coming true. 'Taking care of 
one's own1 is an admirable motive. But when it 
combines with suspicion of, and withdrawal from, the 
public world, it is one of the conditions of the 
despotism . . . feared. (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, 
Swidler, & Tipton, 1985, p. 112) 
Our culture, in general, gives us the ideological 
groundwork for aloneness. After all, we uphold 
individualism and are taught to go to great lengths to 
achieve it. We are not, taught about the harm extensive 
individualism can do to relationships and to our identities. 
Parents want their child to replicate the American dream. 
They want their son or daughter to rise above poverty, to 
make a name for himself or herself, and for other people to 
recognize him or her as being an important person. The 
child's successes and achievements at some point will 
reflect upon the parents, and they will be recognized for 
their role in parenting. Hence, parents can fulfill the 
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American dream through their children, although one must 
consider that an essential part of the American dream is the 
competitive edge which the children have against others. 
They try to undercut other individuals, to perform in ways 
which are considered by set standards as better or higher. 
No where in this dream are they to try to help someone else 
accomplish the "better" level. Instead, the concern is for 
the self and in the interest of the self. Americans uphold 
the concept where: 
. . . the American dream is often a very private dream 
of being the star, the uniquely successful and 
admirable one, the one who stands out from the crowd of 
ordinary folk who don't know how. And since we have 
believed in that dream for a long time and worked very 
hard to make it come true, it is hard for us to give it 
up, even though it contradicts another dream that we 
have—that of living in a society that would really be 
worth living in. (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & 
Tipton, 1985, p. 285) 
Consequently, through our culture's ideology of 
individualism one learns the means of alienation, to the 
point where relationships can be threatened by competition. 
Ultimately individuals can become disempowered and unsure 
about how to relate to others. 
In another light, we have within us a fear of 
conforming too much to society, of being too much like all 
other people. With the loss of individual differences, we 
open ourselves up until we reach the point where we are 
engulfed by the society. In sharing too completely with 
others, we are afraid of losing ourselves in the commonality 
of humanity. We find in our culture: 
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fear that society may overwhelm the individual and 
destroy any chance of autonomy unless he stands against 
it, but also recognition that it is only in relation to 
society that the individual can fulfill himself and 
that if the break with society is too radical, life has 
no meaning at all. (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, 
& Tipton, 1985, p. 144) 
Joe Christmas, overlooking his sadistic and masochistic 
tendencies, dreads being consumed by the society, as he has 
no permanent identity. He constantly tries to evince his 
separateness and, hence, his individuality. We look upon 
our individuality, like Joe, as a safeguard for our 
uniqueness, only to expose to ourselves the reverse side of 
"growing aloneness" (Fromm, 1941, p. 29). We must discover 
and maintain that essential balance between being in 
relationships too much and estranging ourselves from others 
in a guest for individuality. We must be individuals but 
simultaneously be participants within family, neighborhood, 
or community. 
Estrangement 
Additionally resulting from marginality and alienation, 
estrangement contains within it a possible discovery of the 
person one is, but this process can only be actualized in a 
combination of separation and relation. Without undergoing 
the tension of the dialectics, we are severed from defining 
ourselves by comparison with others. After all, only man 
and woman can form relations with others in a recognition of 
their humanity, commonality, and differences: 
An animal never succeeds in unravelling its companions 
from the knot of their common life, just as it never 
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succeeds in ascribing to the enemy an existence beyond 
his hostility, that is, beyond its own realm. Man, as 
man, sets man at a distance and make him independent; 
he lets the life of men like himself go on round about 
him, and so he, and he alone, is able to enter into 
relation, in his own individual status, with those like 
himself. The basis of man's life with man is twofold, 
and it is one—the wish of every man to be confirmed as 
what he is, even as what he can become, by men; and the 
innate capacity in man to confirm his fellow men in 
this way. (Buber, 1965b, pp. 67-68) 
People understand their own being first, or their 
existence in the world (Heidegger, 1962). Because they own 
their being, they have sole ownership of the comprehension. 
The understanding of being-in-the-world, thus, goes hand-in-
hand with their existence, as an understanding of their own 
being-in-the-world enables them to meet others in the world 
and illuminate the others in their being. One's self is the 
most difficult of all beings for one, for he or she can 
cover up true understanding, conceal one's self, and 
alienate himself or herself (Heidegger, 1962). 
In the estrangement of the self from the self, persons 
tumble into inauthenticity, in addition to powerlessness. 
They disown themselves in a world where: 
. . . understanding of the most alien cultures and 
their 'synthesis' with one's own will lead to the final 
and true clarity of man about himself. Many-sided 
curiosity and a restless knowing-all pretend to a 
universal understanding of man's existence. ... In 
this reassured, 'all-comprehending' comparison of 
everything with itself, man's existence rushes toward 
an estrangement in which its ownmost ability for being 
remains hidden. (Heidegger, 1962, p. 178) 
Men and women are driven from this estrangement into deep 
self-analysis. They become so preoccupied with themselves 
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that possibilities for an understanding of the self are 
closed. They fall into an abyss of inauthenticity and learn 
from being in the world some aspects of themselves and 
others, yet if they remain predominately engulfed in their 
alienation, they decrease their capacity for growth 
resulting from relationships with others. 
Hence, through alienation persons are cut off from one 
another, themselves, and the society. They become 
imprisoned within their own world and perceptions, unable to 
break down the bars which keep them from relating to others. 
Their awareness of man and woman as individuals confronts 
them with a problem: 
. . . by being aware of himself as distinct from nature 
and other people, by being aware—even very dimly—of 
death, sickness, aging, he necessarily feels his 
insignificance and smallness in comparison with the 
universe and all others who are not 'he.' Unless he 
belonged somewhere, unless his life had some meaning 
and direction, he would feel like a particle of dust 
and be overcome by his individual insignificance. He 
would not be able to relate himself to any system which 
would give meaning and direction to his life, he would 
be filled with doubt, and this doubt eventually would 
paralyze his ability to act—that is, to live. (Fromm, 
1941, pp. 21-22) 
Without the unification and participation with others, 
life cannot have the same meaning, because "the dignity of 
human existence is in the power of reciprocity" (Heschel, 
1965, p. 46). Marginality and estrangement negate the give-
and-take implicit in relationships, and individuals can fall 
back on themselves and their individuality. They can also 
question the social forces or situations which lead them to 
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feel isolated from others. Distance provides the room for 
reflection and interpretation, with the result that people 
can try to go forth into new relationships. The friction 
between separation and relationship seems to be mandatory 
for individuals to have some meaning in their lives and for 
their existences. Marginality and alienation, as a result, 
not only furnish the distance for individualization but are 
in some senses too one-sided. Human beings can be so caught 
up by themselves that they fail to enter into relationships, 
a stymieing of their potential as a person among other 
people. They must fight the disempowerment and oppression 
contingent with marginality and aloneness, for otherwise 
change may not come. It is only with the hope for modifying 
the dehumanizing conditions around us that we face the 
future with a brighter perception. It is in the realm of 
possibility to struggle against marginality, estrangement, 
and alienation, so that persons can realize their power and 
promise as human beings: 
I live my life in growing orbits, 
which move out over the things of the world. 
Perhaps I can never achieve the last, 
but that will be my attempt. 
I am circling around God, around the ancient tower, 
and I have been circling for a thousand years. 
And I still don't know if I am a falcon. 
Or a storm, or a great song. (Rilke, 1980, p. 76) 
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AFTERWORD 
When I reflect upon the chapters I have written certain 
thoughts filter through my mind. They concern some of the 
complexities I have experienced in the dissertation process, 
particularly in reference to my methoddlogy. First, though, 
I will review some of the points which one can glean from my 
dissertation content. 
Relationships between people, between people and the 
environment, and between people and a spiritual Being form a 
central part of many lives. No matter what we do or fail to 
do, we need to feel connected to others to some extent in 
order to know ourselves and to learn about other 
individuals. Even when we feel distanced and alone, we are 
engaged in a process of relating, for we are undergoing 
another dimension to our relationships, the discovery of the 
sense of I. A lack of having ties with others can lead us 
to self-knowledge where we plummet the depths of our being 
and gain another perspective on the necessity for being 
related to the world around us. Eventually we learn that 
without relationships we cannot exist as the people we are 
and will become in the world that we know. 
Moreover, I have focused predominantly on the I-It 
relationships with other individuals, which tend to make up 
a large portion of our lives. I have tried to show how we, 
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catapulted into the world, must continually fashion and 
refashion our thinking in regard to ourselves and others. 
This self-knowledge, along with factors as race, gender, 
sub-culture, and socio-economic class, helps to mold us into 
the people we are. This is the person we perceive ourselves 
to be and the one we present to others. Sometimes, we can 
additionally experience alienation and marginality, other 
shadings of I-It relationships which aid or hinder the 
determination of our characters. 
Whereas many people have experienced alienation and 
marginality, the inherent distancing of aloneness allows for 
the emergence of our identities, the I persona. With a 
sense of the I, we can go forth into relations to learn 
about others and, hence, about the self. Much of the 
requirement for separateness, however, depends on a notion 
of degree. Cutting ourselves off from others, we can live 
with ourselves too much, to where we can hinder our 
relationships with other persons. Similarly, we can be so 
captured by others that we detract from our self-knowledge, 
from the time we need to be by ourselves. What we work for 
in our relationships becomes a knowledge of ourselves in 
terms of others and of others in regard to the self, a 
dialectic which I have tried to use as one of my primary 
dissertation themes. 
Furthermore, I have depended upon a dialectic between 
theory and practice. I hold that we can take knowledge, as 
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theory, and shape it to fit our experiences, as well as 
reinterpret our experiences from theory. We can also 
utilize our personal experiences to support our knowledge, 
as we continually learn from our interactions or strengthen 
our comprehension. 
With the dissertation so close to me, however, I do not 
believe at this time that I can adequately sum up all of 
s 
what I have gained from writing it. I have thought much 
about the aspects that I have learned from the process and 
would like to share this information, with the reasoning 
that perhaps, other students, like me, may undergo similar 
thoughts and confusions when they write their dissertations. 
I have chosen a letter format for this expression, for 
a letter tends to employ a different tone from a more 
academic and objective form of writing. Because my thoughts 
are personal, I think I would have difficulty distancing 
myself from them to the point of assuring myself of their 
objectivity. Thus, I have decided to employ another mode of 
writing to convey some of my thoughts about a major aspect 
of my dissertation, the manner of research I have used. 
A Personal Note on Mv Research Methodology 
Dear Dr. Purpel, 
In one of our conversations together, you suggested 
that I write a letter explaining some of the confusions and 
frustrations I felt when I was writing the chapters of my 
dissertation. You have helped me throughout the 
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dissertation process, for I would compose sections of a 
chapter and then give the pages to you for editing comments. 
There was an interaction between us, a relationship of 
professor-student, and you have played a decided role in the 
form and content of my chapters. Because you were there, to 
help me and to criticize my work, I wanted to write this 
letter to you. You were my dissertation advisor, as well as 
my friend, and I think you will understand what I am trying 
to say. 
I wonder if some of my distress when I was writing 
could be explained by a series of dialectical relationships 
that I was experiencing. Macdonald used the term dual 
dialectic to denote a "reflecting upon the consequences of 
an action and sounding the depths of our inner selves." I 
believe that I was in the midst not only of such a dual 
dialectic, the self involved within tensions, but of what I 
call multiple dialectics. There were several seemingly 
oppositional concepts internally interacting with one 
another, with the result that I became uncertain about the 
person I saw myself as and the task I was undertaking. Some 
of these dialectics included subjectivity-objectivity, self-
other, and self-culture. 
When I first started thinking about my dissertation, I 
had ideas about what I wanted to do. I hoped to change the 
dissertation form, to make it more creative and expressive 
of its author or authoress. I thought about using a diary 
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structure to show the experiential component of my 
relationships, where I could reveal my thoughts, anxieties, 
and character in a subjective mode of writing. It wasn't 
long, however, before I found that I could not create a 
dissertation as I had wished, mainly because there were 
already existing criteria which were to be met before it 
could be academically accepted. These criteria were 
entrenched within its inherent format, and the way of 
writing I had envisioned was obviously not suitable for the 
subject matter. I could not, for instance, continually use 
the pronoun I as the expressive voice, for the work had to 
extend beyond me to include the experiences and thoughts of 
others. I had, furthermore, to support many of my 
statements and to become aware of the assumptions behind 
them. To uphold the phenomenological methodology I was 
employing, I, to be consistent with the research manner, was 
to distance myself from my experiences in order to perceive 
them more objectively and with as little bias as possible. 
Yet, much of my dissertation centered around my 
experiences and perceptions. I described theories as I 
interpreted them and illumined what I gained from readings. 
Similarly, I narrated experiences I had had, as well as the 
background from which I came. This information is very 
personal, although I found myself having to step back and 
view it as if it pertained to another individual. I was 
looking at myself as an object, seeing my life history as 
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though it were reflected in someone else's mirror, to 
acquire the needed degree of objectivity. Somewhere in the 
tension of this subjectivity and objectivity, I began to 
question my ability to write in an academic manner. 
Another aspect of the dissertation process lay within 
my interactions with you. Usually I would read or reread 
materials, think about the ideas for several weeks, and then 
write for two or three days. I knew what I wanted to say, 
and it was easy for me to understand the points I wanted to 
make. When I gave my work to you, though, I would receive 
it back with remarks as "explain," "overstated," or "needs 
transition." I learned after a while to review my 
paragraphs and to try and look at them from your eyes, the 
viewpoint of another person attempting to understand my 
writing. Often I could see that your remarks were valid, 
for I would skip from one idea or explanation to another 
without putting forth the mental paths I had followed. You 
gently explained to me that my writing demonstrated an 
internalization or identification with the knowledge to the 
point where I assumed other people would reach the same 
conclusions that I had. Perhaps your reasoning was right. 
I really don't know, although I think that the difficulties 
I experienced here were part of growth. I had never before 
written a work of the length of a dissertation, and when I 
had to retrace the progression of my thoughts for the 
benefit of another, I was learning an important point of 
hermeneutics. I was discovering a new sense of sharing, not 
of material goods, but of something much more central to me, 
namely my thinking or my mind. I didn't picture myself in 
the past as a protective person, but in actuality I guess 
that I was. I wanted to keep my ideas and my 
interpretations to myself, for I thought that if I revealed 
too much, I would become too open and vulnerable. But, 
isn't this vulnerability part of the theories of 
relationships I was using as a basis for my dissertation? 
Once more, I became like two separate people. One person 
was hiding behind internal knowledge which only she had 
access, while another person, in line with phenomenology, 
was to be open to the input and interpretations of others. 
Often I would resent the intrusion of the other upon my 
writing, for I think that I was centered too much on the 
self. I had to let down my defenses in my writing so that I 
could be truthful to the person I pictured myself as—one 
who was honest and open to herself and the world around her. 
- As I reflect more on the dissertation structure, I can 
also pick out another tension I was experiencing, the self 
and the culture. I have become aware of this friction 
lately, particularly when I was auditing your moral 
dimensions class. You were explaining value clarification 
to the class and had given us a fictional, albeit corny, 
story from a textbook. The purpose of the exercise was to 
establish some sort of priority among our values, besides 
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clarifying exactly what we believed in. I responded to the 
exercise very quickly, but when I examined what I had listed 
as priorities, I was surprised to note that I really didn't 
think the way my answers indicated. Instead, I had 
responded as to how the pragmatic culture had taught me, 
rather than as to how I, the person, believed. I had 
believed myself to be more sensitive to cultural influences 
than the exercise proved me to be, especially as I had lived 
in another culture for three years. Yet, the ingredients of 
the American culture were very present in my character in 
ways to which I was oblivious. 
This experience caused me to wonder just how the 
material I had written for my dissertation was indicative of 
me, how much was a part of the American culture, and how 
much was a product of how I had been indoctrinated to think. 
Perhaps I can't separate the three facets, as all are 
components of my identity. Still, I would like to know the 
dimensions of the person I am, which entails reflectivity. 
Although I attempted to be both thoughtful and critical in 
my composition, I am certain that cultural biases are 
present in the writing. 
Overall, Dr. Purpel, I was not totally accurate when I 
answered your question about the amount I had learned from 
the dissertation process. I told you that I had learned 
very little. While I was largely truthful in terms of the 
content, I overlooked other areas where I had learned much. 
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I learned from the dissertation form about the accepted 
academic way of writing. I, additionally, became aware of 
the need for clarity and thoroughness within my writing to 
enable other people to share and to follow the train of my 
thinking. Then I began to question how the American culture 
has patterned my thinking, while I found out that 
understanding entails many layers of comprehension. Despite 
my understanding of the material about which I was writing, 
I started to gain a new perspective on it. The process was 
similar to uncovering veil after veil to allow for another, 
brighter sense of illumination. Maybe this procedure of 
differing levels of understanding will continue as I, other 
people, and our world change. In any case, I think that the 
dialectics I have experienced evince Buber's (1970) concept 
of betweenness. The betweenness wasn't merely between two 
people, besides in my relationship with you, but it was also 
within me. I was between subjectivity and objectivity, my 
perception of the self and other, and the discovery of the 
self in the culture. Captured within the friction of these 
multiple tensions, I found myself to be searching for a more 
definite sense of who I was and what my place in the 
academic community would be. I still am not certain about 
these two areas, but I can only try to gauge their 
complexities in the critical and thoughtful manner that you 
have taught and demonstrated for me. 
Sincerely, 
T" 
151 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abbott, S. (1983). Womenfolks: Growing UP down South. New 
Haven: Ticknor & Fields. 
Agee, J. (1960). Let us now praise famous men. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Aisenberg, N., & Harington, M. (1988). Women of academe: 
Outsiders in the sacred grove. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press. 
Anyon, J. (1987). Social class and the hidden curriculum 
of work. In H. S. Shapiro, D. Purpel, & F. Mengert 
(Eds.), The institution of education: Critical 
perspectives (pp. 152-171). Needham Heights, MA: Ginn 
Press. 
Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldberger, N. R., & Tarule, 
J. M. (1986). Women's wavs of knowing: The 
development of self, voice, and mind. New York: Basic 
Books, Inc. 
Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W., Swidler, A., & Tipton, 
T. (1985). Habits of the heart: Individualism and 
commitment in American life. New York: Harper and 
Row. 
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (1976). Schooling in capitalist 
America. New York: Basic Books. 
Bradley, S., Beatty, R., Long, E., & Perkins, G. (Eds.). 
(1974). The American tradition in literature (Vol. 2). 
New York: Grosset and Dunlap. 
Brooks, C. (1963). William Faulkner: The Yoknapatawpha 
country. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Buber, M. (1957). Eclipse of God (M. Friedman, Trans.). 
New York: Harper Torchbooks. 
152 
Buber, M. (1958). I and Thou (R. G. Smith, Trans.)* New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 
Buber, M. (1963). Israel and the world; Essavs in a time 
of crisis (0. Marx, Trans.). New York: Schocken 
Books. 
Buber, M. (1965a). Between man and man. New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company. 
Buber, M. (1965b). The knowledge of man: A philosophy of 
the interhuman. New York: Harper & Row. 
Buber, M. (1966). The way of response (N. N. Glatzer, Ed. 
and Trans.). New York: Schocken Books. 
Buber, M. (1970). I and Thou (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 
Callahan, S. C. (1971). The working mother. New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company. 
Daly, M. (1973). Bevond God the father: Toward a 
philosophy of women's liberation. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
De Beauvoir, S. (1964.) . The second sex (H. M. Parshley, 
Trans.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
De Sensi, J. T. (1980). A study of Martin Buber's I-Thou 
and I-It relationships in sport. Unpublished 
dissertation: University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. 
Dilthey, W. (1961). Meaning in history: W. Dilthev's 
thoughts on history and society (H. P. Rickman, Ed.). 
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Dinnerstein, D. (1976). The mermaid and the minotaur: 
Sexual arrangements and human malaise. New York: 
Harper and Row. 
153 
Faulkner, W. (1932). Light in August. New York: Harrison 
Smith & Robert Haas. 
Faulkner, W. (1936). Absalom, absalomi. New York: The 
Modern Library. 
Femia, J. V. (1981). Gramsci's political thought: 
Hegemony, consciousness, and the revolutionary process. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected interviews 
and other writings: 1972-1977. New York: Pantheon 
Books. 
Freire, P. (1973). Education for critical consciousness. 
New York: The Seabury Press. 
Freire, P. (1983). Pedagogy in process: The letters to 
Guinea-Bissau (C. St. John Hunter, Trans.). New York: 
Continuum. 
Freire, P. (1986). Pedagogy of the oppressed (M. B. Ramos, 
Trans.). New York: Continuum. 
Friedman, M. (1955). Martin Buber: The life of dialogue. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Friedman, M. (1974). The hidden human image. New York: 
Delacorte Press. 
Friedman, M. (1986). Martin Buber and the eternal. New 
York: Human Sciences Press. 
Fromm, E. (1941). Escape from freedom. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston. 
Germani, G. (1980). Marginalitv. New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Transaction Books. 
154 
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological 
theory and women's development. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Glasgow, E. (1963). Vein of iron. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, & World, Inc. 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks 
(Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith, Eds. and Trans.). New York: 
international Publishers. 
Grumet, M. R. (1988). Bitter milk: Women and teaching. 
Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press. 
Gunn, J. (1982). Autobiography: Towards a poetics of 
experience. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press. 
Hammer, S. (1975). Daughters and mothers, mothers and 
daughters. New York: The N. Y. Times Book Co. 
Heidegger, M. (1958). The guestion of being (W. Kluback & 
J. T. Wilde, Trans.). New York: Twayne Publishers. 
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. 
Robinson, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row. 
Heidegger, M. (1977). Basic writings (D. F. Knell, Ed.). 
New York: Harper & Row. 
Heschel, A. (1965). Who is man?. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press. 
Jackson, P. (1987). The daily grind. In H. S. Shapiro, D. 
Purpel, & F. Mengert (Eds.), The institution of 
education: Critical perspectives (pp. 108-136). 
Needham Heights, MA: Ginn Press. 
Kaplan, M. A. (1976). Alienation and identification. New 
York: Collier Macmillan Publishers. 
155 
Karier, C. J. (1972). Testing for order and control in the 
corporate liberal state. Educational Theory. 22(159-
180) . 
Kaufmann, W. (1980). Discovering the mind; Nietzsche. 
Heidegger, and Buber. New York: Mc-Graw Hill. 
Kazin, A. (1966). The stillness of Light in August. In R. 
P. Warren (Ed.)., Faulkner; A collection of critical 
essays (pp. 147-162). Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-
Hall. 
King, M. (1964). Heidegger's philosophy; A guide to his 
basic thought. New York: Macmillan Company. 
Kohanski, A. S. (1982). Martin Buber's philosophy of 
interhuman relation. East Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Associated University Press. 
Kolbenschlag, M. (1981). Kiss Sleeping Beauty good-bve. 
New York, New York: Doubleday and Company. 
Kneller, G. F. (1984). Movements of thought in modern 
education. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Lamm, Z. (1978). The status of knowledge in the radical 
concept of education. In J. R. Gress & D. Purpel 
(Eds.), Curriculum: An introduction to the field (pp. 
124-143). Berkeley, California: Mr. Cutchan 
Publishing Corporation. 
Levertov, D. (1975). The freeing of the dust. New York: 
New Directions Books. 
Macdonald, J. (1978). A transcendental developmental 
ideology of education. In J. R. Gress & D. Purpel 
(Eds.), Curriculum: An introduction to the field 
(pp.95-124). Berkeley, California: Mr. Cutchan 
Publishing Corporation. 
156 
May, H. G., & Metzger, B. M. (Eds.)- (1971). The New 
Oxford Annotated Bible. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
McFague, S. (1987). Models of God: Theology for an 
ecological, nuclear aae. Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press. 
Mead, G. H. (1982). The individual and the social self 
(D. L. Miller, Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Mehta, J. L. (1976). Martin Heidegger: The wav and the 
vision. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii. 
Moore, D. J. (1974). Martin Buber: Prophet of religious 
secularism. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication 
Society of America. 
Mortimer, G. L. (1983). Faulkner's rhetoric of loss: A 
study in perception and meaning. Austin: University 
of Texas Press. 
The 1988 information please almanac, atlas & yearbook (41st 
ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 
O'Connor, F. (1969). Mvsterv and manners (S. Fitzgerald & 
R. Fitzgerald, Eds.). New York: Farrar, Straus, & 
Giroux. 
Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge: Towards a post-
critical philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Rilke, R. M. (1980). I live my life. In R. Bly (Ed. and 
Trans.), News of the universe: Poems of a twofold 
consciousness (p. 76). San Francisco: Sierra Club 
Books. 
Rubin, L. (1976). Worlds of pain: Life in the working-
class family. New York: Basic Books. 
157 
Ryan, J., & Sackrey, C. (1984). Strangers in paradise: 
Academics from the working class. Boston, 
Massachusetts: South End Press. 
Ryan, W. (1971). Blaming the victim. New York: Pantheon 
Books. 
Sennett, R., & Cobb, J. (1973). The hidden injuries of 
class. New York: Vintage Books. 
Sexton, A. (1977). A self portrait in letters (L. G. 
Sexton & L. Ames, Eds.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
Soelle, D. (1974). Political theology. Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press. 
Spring, J. (1980). Educating the worker-citizen. New 
York: Longman. 
Suransky, V. (1980). Phenomenology: An alternative 
research paradigm and a force for social change. 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. 
11(2), 163-179. 
Terkel, S. (1972). Working. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Tindall, G. B. (1976). The ethnic southerners. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 
Welch, S. D. (1985). Communities of resistance and 
solidarity: A feminist theology of liberation. 
Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. 
Wright, S. (1987). Art as idolatry or sacred possibility: 
A hermeneutic study of art education. Unpublished 
dissertation: University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. 
158 
Young, T. D., Watkins, F.. C., & Beatty, R. C. (Eds.). 
(1968). The literature of the South. Atlanta: Scott, 
Foresman & Company. 
